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Abstract 
We find that forecast revisions by analysts with more favorable surnames elicit stronger market 
reactions. The effect is stronger among firms with lower institutional ownership and for analysts 
with non-American first names. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and France and Germany’s 
opposition to the Iraq War, revisions by analysts with Middle Eastern and French or German 
surnames, respectively, generated weaker market reaction. Surname favorability is not associated 
with forecast quality, but it has complementary effects with forecast performance on analysts’ 
career outcomes. Surname favorability mitigates under-reaction to forecast revisions. These 
findings are distinct from the effects of ethnic, cultural proximity, or in-group bias.  
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The first name of an individual is given at birth but the surname is typically inherited from parents 
and reflects the person’s ancestry (Hanks, 2003). For instance, an individual with the surname 
“Yamamoto” is likely to be of Japanese origin, and the surname “Volkmann” might reflect German 
origins. In fact, according to U.S. historical immigration records, 99.0% (85.8%) of U.S. 
immigrants who have the surname “Yamamoto” (“Volkmann”) have come from Japan (Germany). 
Since cultural beliefs and preferences are transmitted across generations (e.g., Guiso et al., 2006; 
Fernández and Fogli, 2009), stereotypes associated with various countries may automatically get 
activated and alter people’s perceptions about an individual based on how favorably they perceive 
the country of origin associated with that individual’s surname.    
In this study, we investigate whether name-induced bias, such as surname favorability, 
affects the information processing and the investment decisions of stock market participants. 
Specifically, we examine whether analysts with favorable surnames generate a stronger market 
reaction to their forecast revisions. Our key conjecture is that investors assess the credibility of 
information in an analyst’s forecast revision more favorably if the analyst has a favorable surname, 
and a more favorable assessment would lead to a stronger market reaction to the analyst’s forecast 
revision. 
This prediction is motivated by two closely related streams of literature in psychology. 
Studies on motivated reasoning show that people’s desire to arrive at a particular conclusion biases 
their judgment (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Kunda and Sinclair, 1999; Sinclair and Kunda, 1999). One of 
the main mechanisms for motivated reasoning is that people are likely to reduce unpleasant 
dissonance among conflicting cognitions (e.g., Kunda, 1990). It suggests that investors who have 
favorable views toward an analyst because of his or her surname are motivated to assess the 
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analyst’s forecasts as being more credible and of higher quality. Making this conclusion reduces 
the unpleasant inconsistency between their favorability toward the analyst and their belief about 
the analyst’s forecast quality.  
Another stream of psychology literature shows that people rely on their subjective feelings 
when making judgments (Klauer and Stern, 1992; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2007; 
Greifeneder et al., 2011; for a review, see Kunda, 1999). In particular, people assign more positive 
evaluations to a subject who has a favorable attribute even though the attribute may be irrelevant 
to their evaluations, because people naturally desire to seek consistency in their attitudes and 
judgments (e.g., Klauer and Stern, 1992). This tendency is also related to the halo effect, where an 
impression created in one area biases the evaluations of the object’s other qualities (e.g., Thorndike, 
1920; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). The effects of motivation and affect on judgement are closely 
related to each other, because affect often drives an individual’s motivation to draw a particular 
conclusion, and both predict investors are more likely to believe that analysts with favorable 
surnames issue high-quality forecasts. As a result, investors react more strongly to forecast 
revisions by analysts with favorable surnames.  
Stock market reaction to analysts’ earnings forecasts provides a good empirical setting in 
which to examine whether people’s subjective opinions about an individual based on his or her 
surname affects their evaluation of the individual as well as the information provided by the 
individual. Analyst forecasts are an important source of information for stock investment decisions, 
and investors’ evaluation of an analyst, such as forecasting ability, influences the strength of the 
market’s reaction (e.g., Park and Stice, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2003). Investors can easily observe 
an analyst’s surname when forecasts are released. Consequently, their favorability of the analyst, 
formed through their opinion about the countries of origin inferred from the surname, can influence 
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how they evaluate and process the information in the analyst’s forecasts.  
Following Pan et al. (2017), we first identify countries of origin associated with a surname 
by using the U.S. historical immigration records available on ancestry.com. We then measure the 
level of Americans’ favorability toward an analyst’s surname by taking the weighted average of 
the favorability ratings from Gallup poll data for countries associated with the surname.1  
Using 762,780 forecast revisions issued by U.S. equity analysts from 1996 to 2014, we 
find that market responds more strongly to forecast revisions issued by analysts who have more 
favorable surnames. The surname favorability effect holds after controlling for a large number of 
analyst, firm, and forecast characteristics known to affect the strength of market reactions. Further, 
our results are economically significant. For example, we find that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the favorability of an analyst’s surname translates into a 6.30% stronger return-revision 
relation. This effect is comparable to those resulting from a change in other major analyst 
characteristics, such as the number of years an analyst has worked in the profession (5.56%) and 
the number of firms an analyst covers in a year (-6.61%).2 
We perform a series of robustness checks by altering sample restrictions or adopting 
different measures of favorability. Our results remain qualitatively the same when we use analysts’ 
last forecasts for a firm-fiscal year only, exclude forecast revisions issued concurrently with other 
peer analysts’ forecasts or corporate disclosures, use different definitions of surname favorability, 
and measure favorability based on full names. We also run a falsification test to confirm that our 
results are not a statistical artifact. 
In the next set of tests, we find that the effect is more pronounced for firms that are largely 
                                           
1 We describe our measure of surname favorability in more detail in Section 2.4. 
2 We offer a detailed interpretation in Section 3.1. 
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held by individual investors, for analysts whose countries of origin are easily inferred from their 
surname, and for negative forecast revisions. We further find that the surname favorability effect 
is weaker for all-star analysts, female analysts, and analysts who use American first names. We 
find that our results are robust to including a host of fixed effects. 
Unlike static name traits, such as ethnicity and foreignness, that prior studies examine, 
surname favorability has both cross-sectional and time variation. To better establish the causal 
relation between the favorability of an analyst’s surname and market reactions to forecast revisions, 
we use two exogenous shocks that adversely affected Americans’ favorability toward certain 
countries: the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks and the French and German governments’ 
opposition to the Iraq War. We find that the strength of the market’s reaction to forecast revisions 
significantly decreases for analysts with Middle Eastern and French or German surnames after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and the French and German opposition to the Iraq War, respectively, 
compared to control analysts. The results strengthen our identification of surname favorability 
effects.  
Next, we find that there is no significant relation between the favorability of an analyst’s 
surname and his or her forecast quality, which is measured by accuracy, bias, and timeliness. The 
evidence suggests that investors’ subjective perception, such as surname favorability, biases their 
information processing despite no systematic difference in forecast quality.3 In terms of career 
outcomes, we find that, conditional on good forecasting performance, having a favorable surname 
makes it more likely for an analyst to be elected as an all-star or survive in the profession after his 
or her brokerage house’s merger or closure. Thus, the results suggest that surname favorability 
                                           
3 Several theory papers show that the effect of irrational trading can persist over time, as investors who irrationally 
trade can, on average, earn higher expected profits compared with fully rational traders (e.g., De Long et al., 1991; 
Kyle and Wang, 1997; Fischer and Verrecchia, 1999; Verrecchia, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003).  
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serves as a catalyst for career progression.   
To identify specific channels that generate the surname favorability effect, we decompose 
our measure of surname favorability into individual components associated with in-group bias, 
cultural, ethnic and linguistic proximity, and the perceived level of corruption in countries 
associated with a surname. We find that the favorability component associated with the foreignness 
of an analyst’s name significantly increases the market’s reaction to forecast revisions. The result 
suggests that in-group bias against foreigners (Kumar et al., 2015) plays a significant role in our 
finding.  
More interestingly, we find strong evidence that the residual component of favorability 
significantly and positively affects the market’s reaction to forecast revisions. It suggests that the 
unexplained portion of surname favorability unrelated to cultural, ethnic, and country factors is an 
important driver for the market’s reaction to forecast revisions. This finding distinguishes our work 
from prior studies that examine the effect of cultural proximity or in-group bias in financial 
markets (e.g., Kumar et al., 2015; Du et al., 2017; Jia et al., 2017). 
Finally, we examine whether surname favorability mitigates investor underreaction to 
forecast revisions. Using a subsample with a clear manifestation of post-revision price drifts 
(Gleason and Lee, 2003), we find that surname favorability is associated with a significantly 
weaker post-revision price drift. This suggests that a stronger immediate market reaction to a 
forecast revision by an analyst with a favorable surname mitigates investor underreaction to the 
forecast revision. 
These results contribute to several strands of the accounting and finance literature. Recent 
studies use peoples’ names to identify their cultural origins and examine how their cultural origins 
affect their behavior and performance (e.g., Brochet et al., 2016; Du et al., 2017; Ellahie et al., 
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2017; Jia et al., 2017). For example, Brochet et al. (2016) use surnames to identify CEOs from 
individualistic cultures. They find that CEOs from individualistic cultures disclose information 
more optimistically and in a self-referencing manner. Du et al. (2017) also use surnames to identify 
analysts with Chinese origin. They find that Chinese analysts issue more accurate forecasts for 
Chinese firms. Our study is distinct from these studies as we use names to capture others’ 
subjective evaluation of an individual rather than the cultural beliefs of the individual. 
Our study is closely related to Kumar et al. (2015), except with important differences. They 
focus on Americans’ in-group bias against foreigners and find that fund managers with foreign-
sounding names have lower fund flows than do others. In contrast, we focus on the favorability of 
a name based on countries of origin that are associated with that name and examine its effect on 
the strength of market reaction. While the foreignness of a name is dichotomous and does not vary 
over time, surname favorability has a significant cross-sectional and time variation even among 
the same group of foreigners. We also confirm that the effect of surname favorability is not fully 
explained by Americans’ in-group bias like in Kumar et al. (2015).  
Our findings also contribute to the literature on the determinants of stock market reaction 
to analyst forecast revisions. Prior studies on market reaction to forecast revisions have mostly 
focused on the effects of analyst attributes that are related to forecast quality, such as forecasting 
experience and accuracy (e.g., Park and Stice, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2003). Extant studies have 
found that institutional ownership tends to strengthen the effect of these attributes on market 
reactions to forecast revisions (e.g., Bonner et al., 2003), suggesting that more sophisticated 
investors are better able to utilize the information regarding the quality and credibility of an 
analyst’s forecasts. In contrast, our paper provides a new insight that market reaction to an 
analyst’s forecasts is influenced by investors’ perception of that analyst’s surname, which is not 
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related to the analyst’s forecasting ability. It is noteworthy that, unlike most analyst attributes 
related to forecasting performance, surname favorability mainly affects investment decisions of 
relatively less sophisticated individual investors. 
We also contribute to the growing literature that investigates how economic outcomes, 
such as the price discount of securities or cross-border mergers and acquisitions, are affected by 
the popularity of a country (e.g., Hwang, 2011). In addition, our findings have implications for the 
labor market outcomes of these practitioners (e.g., Mikhail et al., 1999). We show that having a 
favorable surname has a complementary relation with forecast performance and serves as a catalyst 
in career progression.  
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
In this section, we describe our sample selection procedure and introduce two main 
datasets: (1) a hand-collected dataset of countries of origin for equity analysts in the United States 
and (2) a dataset of Americans’ favorability of foreign countries, complied using Gallup survey 
results. We also describe how we construct our measure of surname favorability using the two 
datasets, and we present descriptive statistics for the main variables. 
2.1. Sample Selection 
 We begin our sample construction by collecting data on equity analysts’ one-year-ahead 
forecasts of annual earnings and the U.S. firms’ actual earnings from Thomson Reuters’ 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). To avoid the potential rounding problems pointed 
out by Diether et al. (2002), we directly adjust the I/B/E/S estimates using adjustment factors in 
the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) without rounding to the nearest penny. We drop 
an earnings forecast if it is issued after a firm’s actual earnings announcement date, because the 
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forecast is likely to be subject to data error. We also delete earnings forecasts associated with more 
than one analyst surname in I/B/E/S in order to establish a clear link between the identity of an 
analyst and the market’s reaction to the analyst’s forecast revision.  
We merge the analyst data with Compustat, CRSP, and Thomson Reuters’ Institutional 
(13F) Holdings file to obtain information on firms’ annual fundamentals, stock price, and 
institutional ownership, respectively. After deleting observations with missing values, we have the 
final sample of 762,780 firm-year-analyst-forecast horizons for 5,516 unique analysts and 6,495 
unique firms from 1996 to 2014.  
2.2. Data on Countries of Origin for the Surnames of Equity Analysts in the United States 
 Following Pan et al. (2017), we identify the countries of origin associated with a surname 
using U.S. historical immigration records retrieved from ancestry.com. For each surname of an 
equity analyst in our sample, we identify the nationalities of all immigrants who entered the United 
States through the port of New York between 1820 and 1957 and have the same surname.4  
In our study, we have 5,516 unique analysts (3,983 unique surnames) in the sample and 
collect 13,353,663 immigration records from U.S. immigrants whose surname is identical to our 
sample analysts’. We then drop immigration records with a missing nationality and manually check 
and correct minor typos. Also, we standardize and regroup some nationalities if appropriate (e.g., 
England, Scotland, and Wales into Great Britain).5 This procedure allows us to reclassify 1,629 
unique nationalities in the raw dataset of the immigration records into 116 countries of origin.6 In 
                                           
4 Since we examine the effect of the market perception of analyst surnames, our study does not rely on the countries 
of origin associated with an analyst’s surname correctly representing the analyst’s actual countries of origin. 
5 We refer to the data-processing procedure in Pan et al. (2017). 
6 Among the 116 countries in our classification, we have “USA,” “Unidentifiable” (for non-missing but indiscernible 
nationalities), and other uninformative categories that refer to either geographic regions (e.g., Asia and Central 
America) or ethnic groups (e.g., Hispanic and Jewish). We do not use these categories in our empirical analyses, unless 
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Appendix A, we list the 116 countries of origin and provide summary statistics for the distributions 
of countries of origin that are associated with the surnames of equity analysts in our sample.  
2.3. Data on Favorability of Foreign Countries 
 We measure investors’ favorability toward analysts’ countries of origin inferred from their 
surnames using responses to a particular question from a Gallup survey: “I’d like your overall 
opinion of some foreign countries. Is your overall opinion of the following country very favorable, 
mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” We use Gallup data from 1996, 
because Gallup Analytics covers few countries prior to 1996, and the analyst data (e.g., forecast 
dates) in I/B/E/S are also known to be relatively inaccurate for the early 1990s (Clement and Tse, 
2003; Cooper et al., 2001; Jiang et al., 2016).7  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for Americans’ favorability of foreign countries 
from Gallup Analytics from 1996 to 2014. Each number indicates the average percentage of survey 
participants who selected a given item on the five-point favorability rating scale. Notably, 
Americans’ perceptions about favorable foreign countries are considerably varied. For example, 
Iran is perceived as “Very Favorable” by only 1.8% of Americans participating in the Gallup 
surveys, whereas Canada is viewed as “Very Favorable” by 45.0% of Americans. 
In our study, we use the total percentage of survey participants who answered “Very 
Favorable” or “Mostly Favorable” as a primary measure of Americans’ favorability toward the 
country. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of Americans’ favorability across countries. Each bar 
                                           
otherwise stated. When an immigrant has a dual nationality (e.g., Russia and Poland), we select the former by default. 
However, we choose the latter (1) when the former is USA but the latter is not, or (2) when the latter is the only country 
covered in Gallup surveys. 
7 Prior to 1996, Gallup carried out its surveys covering 11, 17, 6, and 3 countries in 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1993, 
respectively. It has conducted a survey almost every year since 1996. 
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indicates the average level of Americans’ favorability toward a country during the sample period 
from 1996 to 2014. 
2.4. A Measure of Surname Favorability and Summary Statistics 
We now construct a measure of surname favorability (FavSurname) using the two datasets 
described in the previous sections. Specifically, for an individual analyst, we measure the 
favorability of the analyst’s surname (FavSurname) as the weighted average of the Gallup’s 
favorability ratings for countries that match the nationalities of U.S. immigrants who share the 
analyst’s surname. 8 We compute our measure of surname favorability using the most recent 
favorability ratings available in the Gallup surveys as of each forecast revision date. Following 
Pan et al. (2017), we assign a weight to each of the countries associated with a surname according 
to the frequency of the country reported as the nationality of U.S. immigrants sharing the same 
surname. The sum of the weights equals one and we only consider countries with non-missing 
favorability ratings. In Appendix B, we provide examples of analysts’ surnames across the deciles 
of the mean level of surname favorability (FavSurname). For brevity, we report only the 10 
surnames with the lowest mean favorability levels in each decile.  
One notable feature of our measure of surname favorability (FavSurname) is that it 
enables us to capture time-series variation in Americans’ opinions about a given analyst’s surname. 
In Table 2, we provide descriptive evidence for the time variation in our measure of surname 
favorability. In Panel A of Table 2, we illustrate a real-life example of the most and least variable 
                                           
8 We note that South Korea and North Korea are not distinguished in the U.S. historical immigration records, and 
Gallup Analytics provides favorability ratings on South and North Korea separately. In our study, we assume that all 
immigrants who entered the United States from Korea between the 1800s and the 1900s are South Koreans, because 
North Korean refugees have only been recently allowed to enter the United States after the North Korean Human 
Rights Act was passed in October 2004. In untabulated tests, we drop immigration records related to Korea and find 
that our results remain unchanged. 
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surnames in our sample. The most and least variable surnames are determined based on the 
standard deviation of yearly mean levels of surname favorability (FavSurname) for each surname. 
In Panel B, we report the mean spread (i.e., highest level – lowest level) of our measure of surname 
favorability for all analysts’ surnames in our sample across the deciles of the variation of surname 
favorability. The deciles are ranked by the standard deviation of yearly mean levels of surname 
favorability (FavSurname). The results in Table 2 suggest that a large number of analysts 
experience considerable time variations in their surname favorability. For example, analysts in the 
top-three deciles of variability have an average favorability spread over 10% (13.2%~28.6%). 
 We report summary statistics for our main variables in Table 3. Panel A of Table 3 shows 
that the favorability of an analyst’s surname, FavSurname, has the mean and the median of 0.784 
and 0.808, respectively. This suggests that our sample analysts, on average, have surnames 
originating from countries favorably viewed by about 80% of Americans. Overall, we find that 
summary statistics for control variables are consistent with prior studies (Clement et al., 2011; 
Jiang et al., 2016).9 
 In Panel B of Table 3, we divide the sample into two groups based on the sample median 
of surname favorability (FavSurname) and compare analyst, forecast, and firm characteristics 
across the two groups. We find that there is no significant difference in terms of forecast quality, 
such as Accuracy and Forecast bias, across analysts in the two groups. For other characteristics, 
we find that analysts with more favorable surnames tend to update their forecasts more quickly 
following the issuance of others’ forecasts (Days since last forecast), make forecasts earlier in a 
fiscal year (Forecast horizon), and have more years of experience in the profession (General 
                                           
9 We take the natural logarithm of some control variables, such as brokerage size, days since last forecast, forecast 
horizon, forecast frequency, firm size, firm-specific experience, and general experience, to adjust their skewed 
distributions. In untabulated tests, we find that our results are not affected by the logarithm transformation. 
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experience). They also tend to cover larger firms with a higher book-to-market ratio and higher 
institutional ownership, compared to analysts with less favorable surnames. Overall, Panel B of 
Table 3 emphasizes the importance of controlling for analyst, forecast, and firm characteristics in 
our regression analyses. 
3. Surname Favorability and Stock Market Reaction 
 In this section, we examine whether analysts with more favorable surnames elicit stronger 
market reactions to their earnings forecast revisions. We also provide a battery of robustness checks 
and investigate cross-sectional variations in our findings. 
3.1. Market Reaction Regression Estimates: Baseline Results 
 A large volume of studies in psychology show that motivation and affect can strongly 
influence people’s judgment.10 In particular, people are motivated to make certain conclusions to 
seek consistency in their attitudes and beliefs, because conflicting cognitions generate unpleasant 
feelings (e.g., Kunda, 1990). Thus, we conjecture that investors’ favorability toward an analyst’s 
surname influences their evaluation of the analyst and further biases their cognitive processing of 
information provided by the analyst, leading to different market reactions to forecast revisions. 
Our main hypothesis is that analysts with more favorable surnames elicit stronger market 
reactions to their earnings forecast revisions. To examine the relation between the favorability of 
analysts’ surnames and market reactions to their forecast revisions, we estimate a baseline ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression in which the dependent variable is a size-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) around the forecast revision date.11 Following recent studies (e.g., Jiang 
                                           
10 Kunda (1990), Klauer and Stern (1992), Kunda and Sinclair (1999), Sinclair and Kunda (1999), Loewenstein et al. 
(2001), Slovic et al. (2007), and Greifeneder et al. (2011). See Kunda (1999) for a review. 
11 In untabulated tests, we find that results are essentially unaffected when we use an equal-weighted market return 
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et al., 2016), we measure the market’s reaction over four different estimation windows, beginning 
on trading day -1 and ending on trading day +1, +3, +5, and +10 of the revision date. We focus on 
the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between the favorability of an analyst’s surname 
and her forecast revision (FavOrigin×Revision) in our regressions. We predict a positive 
coefficient in accordance with our hypothesis.  
Our set of control variables include firm, analyst, and forecast characteristics known to 
affect the market’s response to forecast revisions (e.g., Clement and Tse, 2003; Gleason and Lee, 
2003; Clement et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2016). Specifically, we include firm characteristics such 
as firm size, book-to-market ratio, institutional ownership, past 12-month returns preceding a 
forecast revision date (Momentum), and the number of analysts following a firm. As controls for 
analyst characteristics, we use an analyst’s gender, brokerage size, forecast frequency, firm-
specific experience, general experience, and the number of firms and the number of industries an 
analyst follows. We also control for the past forecast accuracy of an analyst for a given firm (i.e., 
lagged accuracy) to rule out the possibility that the stronger market reactions we capture are driven 
by the analyst’s superior forecasting ability. Lastly, we control for forecast characteristics, such as 
the number of days elapsed since the last forecast was issued (Days since last forecast), as a proxy 
for the new information content in a forecast revision (Cooper et al., 2001) and the forecast horizon 
to capture a walk-down pattern in analyst forecasts (e.g., Ke and Yu, 2006). In all regression 
specifications, we include firm and year fixed effects to capture unobservable and time-invariant 
firm and year attributes. Following Bradshaw et al. (2013), we cluster standard errors at the analyst 
level to allow for correlations in residuals within each analyst group.12
                                           
as the return benchmark and calculate a buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) instead of a CAR. 
12 In untabulated tests, we find that results hold, regardless of whether standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
or at the analyst-firm level.  
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In Panel A of Table 4, we estimate the baseline OLS regression to examine the impact of 
the favorability of analysts’ surnames on market reactions to their forecast revisions. Consistent 
with our prediction, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term between Revision and 
FavSurname is statistically significant and positive across all columns. In untabulated tests, we 
find qualitatively the same results using a rank or dichotomized variable of FavSurname (e.g., 
quintile ranks, or an indicator for the surname favorability that is greater than the sample median). 
Our results suggest that, all else being equal, investors more strongly respond to forecast revisions 
issued by analysts who have more favorable surnames. Our results are also economically 
meaningful. For example, based on the result in column (2), which includes the entire set of control 
variables, a one-standard-deviation increase in FavSurname translates into a 6.30% increase in the 
return-revision relation.13 The magnitude (6.30%) of the change in the return-revision relation due 
to surname favorability is quite comparable to those resulting from other major analyst 
characteristics, such as General experience (5.56%) and Number of firms (-6.61%), which are two 
important proxies for analysts’ skills and task complexity (e.g., Clement, 1999).14  
3.2. Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks 
 In this section, we examine alternative explanations for our findings and provide 
robustness checks. First, following O’Brien (1990) and Clement and Tse (2003), we re-estimate 
our baseline regressions using the last forecast of an analyst for a firm-fiscal year pair and report 
the results in Panel B of Table 4. Although the sample size considerably shrinks by 72.00% to 
                                           
13 0.431 (coefficient on Revision×FavSurname) × 0.113 (standard deviation of FavSurname) ÷ 0.773 (coefficient on 
Revision) = 0.063  
14 We find that the incremental change in adjusted R2, resulting from the inclusion of our measure of surname 
favorability, is 0.01%, which may look small but is highly comparable to that from other major analyst characteristics 
(e.g., General experience = 0.01%, Number of firms = 0.00%). We believe that such small changes in adjusted R2 are 
partly attributable to abnormal stock returns, which contain a large amount of unexplainable variability.  
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213,549 firm-year-analysts in Panel B, we still find statistically significant results. 
 Second, we address the concern that our results might be spuriously driven by market 
reactions contaminated by other analysts’ forecasts or corporate announcements. We drop forecast 
revisions issued on firm-days during which other analysts’ forecasts, the firm’s quarterly earnings, 
or managerial forecasts are released. We retrieve the actual dates of firms’ quarterly earnings 
announcements and managerial forecasts from I/B/E/S and First Call, respectively.15 As reported 
in Panel C of Table 4, we find that results remain similar to those obtained in Panel A. The results 
suggest that our findings are not driven by the confounding effects of other analysts’ forecasts and 
corporate announcements. 
 Third, we address concerns that our results may be sensitive to the way we construct our 
measure of surname favorability. In the Gallup surveys, Americans’ favorability of a country is 
assessed using five-point Likert scales: Very Favorable, Mostly Favorable, Mostly Unfavorable, 
Very Unfavorable, and Others. One possible concern is that survey results based on Likert scales 
can be subject to the central tendency bias (e.g., Peer et al., 2014), which refers to the tendency of 
survey participants to choose moderate Likert items, such as “Mostly Favorable” and “Mostly 
Unfavorable,” when they have a neutral or undecided opinion about a question. To address this 
concern, we consider survey responses for the most extreme Likert item, “Very Favorable,” to 
measure the favorability of a country. Results, which are reported on the first row of Panel D in 
Table 4, look very similar to our main results in Panel A.16 
In addition, we construct an alternative measure of favorability by taking into account the 
                                           
15 In this analysis, we limit our sample to the period up to 2010 because of the data availability of managerial forecasts 
in the First Call’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. 
16 In untabulated tests, we further construct a measure of surname unfavorability (Un_FavSurname) using the most 
extreme item on the opposite side, “Very Unfavorable,” and find significant and negative coefficients on 
Revision×Un_FavSurname across all columns. 
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entire distribution of the Gallup survey responses. Following Hwang (2011), we compute a 
composite score of favorability as 4 × (%Very Favorable) + 3 × (%Mostly Favorable) + 2 × 
(%Mostly Unfavorable) + 1 × (%Very Unfavorable). We report results using this composite score 
of favorability on the second row of Panel D in Table 4.17 Overall, the results reported in Panel D 
of Table 4 show that our results are not sensitive to how we construct our measure of surname 
favorability. 
 Next, we also consider a subset of dominant country origins that are strongly associated 
with a given surname in calculating the surname favorability. In Panel E of Table 4, we find that 
our results are essentially unaffected by using either one or three of the most dominant origins 
associated with a surname.  
 Finally, we perform a falsification test. We construct a placebo measure of surname 
favorability, FavSurname (P), using the Gallup’s favorability ratings for falsified countries that 
come immediately after the actual countries of origin in an alphabetically ordered list of 116 
countries shown in Appendix A (e.g., Germany is replaced with Great Britain). We re-estimate the 
baseline OLS market reaction regressions using the placebo measure and report the results in Table 
5. We find no statistical significance for the coefficients on the interaction term, 
Revision×FavSurname (P), across all columns. This provides further reinforcement that our 
finding about the surname favorability effect is not a mere statistical artifact.  
3.3. Subsample Analyses  
Thus far, we have established that investors more strongly respond to forecast revisions 
                                           
17 In untabulated tests, we find that the results remain qualitatively the same when we use a different composite score, 
measured as 2 × (%Very Favorable) + 1 × (%Mostly Favorable) -1 × (%Mostly Unfavorable) -2 × (%Very 
Unfavorable). 
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issued by analysts who have more favorable surnames. This finding naturally poses a question of 
whether the extent to which surname favorability influences investors’ reactions varies with the 
level of investor sophistication.  
Prior studies have found evidence that individual investors are less sophisticated compared 
with institutional investors, in that they have limited ability to correctly process information and 
incorporate its implication into stock prices, thereby biasing market reactions to the information 
to a greater extent (e.g., Bartov et al., 2000; Bonner et al., 2003; Collins et al., 2003). Following 
the aforementioned studies, we use the percentage of common shares held by institutional investors 
as a proxy for investor sophistication and predict that the surname favorability effect will be more 
pronounced for firms that are largely owned by individual investors. This approach is based on the 
assumption that the stock price is determined by a weighted average of all investors’ beliefs, as 
shown in several theoretical models (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1994, 1997; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 
2003). Under this assumption, the beliefs of institutional investors (sophisticated investors) should 
have a stronger influence on the stock price of a firm with higher institutional ownership.  
We divide the sample into two groups based on the sample median of institutional 
ownership and report the results of our baseline regressions for each subsample in Panel A of Table 
6. Consistent with our prediction, we find a significant surname favorability effect using the 
subsample of low institutional ownership, whereas the results are mostly insignificant using the 
subsample of high institutional ownership.18 The evidence indicates that individual investors, who 
are less sophisticated, are more susceptible to subjective feelings or opinions, including surname 
favorability. 
                                           
18 In untabulated tests, we divide the sample into tertiles or quintiles of institutional ownership. We find a monotonic 
relationship between the surname favorability effect and institutional ownership. 
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Next, we investigate whether the surname favorability effect varies with the level of 
difficulty in inferring a country of origin from a surname. For example, if an analyst has a surname 
commonly used by people in a certain country, investors would be able to easily infer countries of 
origin from the surname and use the information to form their perception about the surname. In 
contrast, if a surname is associated with a large number of countries, investors find it more difficult 
to clearly infer the country of origin associated with the surname. For example, an analyst has the 
surname “Yamamoto,” and 99.0% of U.S. immigrants sharing the same surname are from Japan, 
according to U.S. historical immigration records from ancestry.com. In this case, we believe that 
investors would infer that the analyst is of Japanese origin. In contrast, it is not straightforward to 
identify a specific country of origin for an analyst whose surname is “Boris.” According to U.S. 
immigration records, Poland is the most common country of origin for the surname Boris, yet it 
only accounts for 12.8% of the U.S. immigrants sharing the same surname.  
We assume that it is easier to infer origins from a surname when a single country accounts 
for a greater fraction of the nationalities of the U.S. immigrants who have the same surname (e.g., 
99.0% Japanese for Yamamoto). We divide all analysts into two subsamples by the sample-median 
fraction of the U.S. immigrants whose nationalities match one single most common country for a 
surname. In the subsample of easy names, we find that coefficients on Revision×FavSurname are 
positive and significant across all columns (Panel B of Table 6). However, in the subsample of 
difficult names, we only find marginally significant or insignificant results. The results are 
consistent with our prediction that surname favorability would play a greater role when investors 
can easily infer countries of origin from a surname. 
We now investigate whether the surname favorability effect is weaker for analysts who 
are more visible and have a higher reputation. Our conjecture is that the importance of having a 
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favorable surname will diminish for analysts who are already well recognized in the profession. 
To test this conjecture, we construct two subsamples based on whether an analyst has been ranked 
as an all-star analyst in Institutional Investor magazine (i.e., all-star vs. non-all-star analysts). 
Consistent with our conjecture, we find stronger results in the subsample of non-all-star analysts 
compared to the subsample of all-star analysts (Panel C of Table 6).19,20  
Next, we examine whether the surname favorability effect varies with the sign of news 
contained in forecast revisions. According to the theory of motivated reasoning, people find 
creative ways to distort information in self-serving ways in order to arrive at their desired 
conclusions (Kunda, 1990). In other words, people take information that is consistent with their 
preferences at face value, but attempt to scrutinize and discredit information that is inconsistent 
with their preferences (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Sinclair and Kunda, 1999; Kunda and Spencer, 2003; 
Hales, 2007; Kadous et al., 2008). For example, Sinclair and Kunda (1999) find in their experiment 
that a black doctor who delivers praise is viewed as a doctor, but the same doctor is viewed as a 
black person and rated as relatively incompetent if he criticizes the participants. Their evidence 
suggests that when people receive information containing bad news, they attempt to dispel the 
information by discrediting the individual who delivers the information. 
As shown in Panel A, Table 6, the surname favorability effect is predominantly driven by 
individual investors who face greater short-sale constraints compared to institutional investors 
                                           
19 We alleviate concern that stronger results for non-all-star analysts are attributable to its relatively larger sample size 
(558,444 obs.). To make its sample size more comparable to that of all-star analysts (204,336 obs.), we identify a 
subset of non-all-star analysts who have never been elected an all-star despite many years of having worked in the 
profession as an analyst (e.g., General experience greater than 10 years). This yields a smaller subsample of non-all-
star analysts (173,113 obs.), in which we still find a strong surname favorability effect (untabulated). 
20 In untabulated tests, we divide all-star analysts into two groups based on the degree of their reputation, which is 
proxied by the total number of all-star elections they have received before each forecast revision date. The weak, but 
significant, results for all-star analysts in Panel C are mostly concentrated on those who have been elected four times 
or less. The results suggest that the surname favorability effect gradually dissipates even within an all-star analyst 
group as analysts gain recognition.  
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(Nagel, 2005). Thus, it is quite reasonable to assume that downward forecast revisions for the stock 
they have purchased would be against their preferences, making them prone to discrediting the 
analyst who issued the unfavorable forecasts by activating negative perceptions associated with 
the analyst’s surname. This implies that the surname favorability effect will be stronger for 
negative forecast revisions. Consistent with our conjecture, we find stronger results in the 
subsample of negative forecast revisions in Panel D of Table 6. 
 We further examine a cross-sectional variation of our finding across analysts’ gender in 
Panel E of Table 6. We only find significant results in the subsample of male analysts.21 We have 
two possible explanations for insignificant results for female analysts. First, it could be due to an 
intensified measurement error arising from the widespread cultural practice of women changing 
their surnames upon marriage. Second, it might reflect a gender variation in our surname 
favorability effect. In a related context, prior studies have found that the degree of racial 
discrimination or stereotypes varies with gender (e.g., Honora, 2002; Swanson et al., 2003; 
Chavous et al., 2008). For example, Honora (2002) and Swanson et al. (2003) find that ethnic 
minority men receive more negative treatment than women of the same ethnic group from others, 
suggesting that having an unfavorable surname could be more detrimental to male analysts than to 
female analysts. 
Lastly, we examine whether our finding weakens when analysts use American first names. 
Considering that first names may convey information about which American generation the 
                                           
21 To mitigate the concern that stronger results for male analysts are due to the relatively larger sample size of male 
analysts, in untabulated tests, we further confine our test to a subset of male analysts’ forecast revisions that are 
analogous in sample size and in characteristics to those of female analysts. We use a coarsened exact matching (CEM) 
and the following matching covariates: forecast accuracy, brokerage size, forecast horizon, forecast frequency, general 
experience, lagged accuracy, and number of firms. We identify 95,637 male analysts’ forecast revisions matched with 
95,637 female analysts’ and still find significant results for male analysts.  
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individual is (e.g., foreign-born first generation vs. American-born second generation), we predict 
that having an American first name, such as John and Jane, will dampen the effect of surname 
favorability. We define a first name as Americanized if it appears on the list of 100 most popular 
first names for male and female babies born in the United States over the past 100 years (1917–
2016) (the list is available from the Social Security website at www.ssa.gov). Consistent with our 
prediction, we find weaker results using analysts who have Americanized first names (Panel F of 
Table 6). Despite a relatively larger sample size for analysts with Americanized first names, the 
coefficient estimates for Revision×FavSurname are only significant in two of the four columns in 
which control variables are included. In contrast, all columns that include control variables 
(columns (2), (4), (6), and (8)) show significant results for analysts with non-Americanized first 
names.22  
4. Additional Identification Tests 
In this section, we further enhance the identification of the surname favorability effect by 
using various fixed effects and two natural experiments. 
4.1. Variations within Analyst-Year, Firm-Year, or Analyst-Firm 
An analyst’s earnings forecasts for a firm are revised several times throughout a year, and 
Gallup usually conducts a survey on perceptions of country favorability once or twice a year. 
Motivated by these features of our sample, we use various fixed effects models to further control 
for any confounding effects arising at the analyst-year, firm-year, or analyst-firm level.  
                                           
22 As robustness checks, we define Americanized first names using the top-50 most popular male and female names 
and find similar results. We also conduct a subsample analysis using analysts’ full name. We divide the sample into 
American-sounding full names and foreign-sounding full names using our measure of Foreignness. We find strong 
results using the subsample of foreign-sounding full names whose sample size is more than 10 times smaller than its 
counterpart.  
22 
In Table 7, we re-estimate the baseline regression after including various combinations of 
additional fixed effects.23 In columns (1) and (2), we control for analyst×year fixed effects and/or 
industry fixed effects, which absorb the effects of analyst-year factors, such as an analyst’s 
background, education, and experience. Strong evidence for the surname favorability effect 
confirms that our results are not driven by confounding effects of unobservable analyst 
characteristics. Similarly, we also include firm×year fixed effects or analyst×firm fixed effects in 
the remaining columns of Table 7 to additionally control for other unobservable factors at the firm-
year or analyst-firm level, including firm characteristics and the connection between the analyst 
and the firm. Overall, we find that results remain qualitatively the same after controlling for 
unobservable factors at the analyst-year, firm-year, or analyst-firm level.  
4.2. Two Natural Experiments for Surname Favorability 
 To better establish a causal relation between the favorability of an analyst’s surname and 
the market’s reaction to his or her forecast revisions, we carry out difference-in-differences tests 
using two natural experiments: (1) the 9/11 terrorist attacks and (2) the French and German 
governments’ opposition to the Iraq War.  
 In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
reported a surge in hate crimes and harassment against Muslims, Arabs, and others who were 
thought to be of Middle Eastern origins (Anderson, 2002). Academic articles also report evidence 
that discrimination and prejudice against Muslims substantially rose following the 9/11 attacks 
(Sheridan, 2006; Kumar et al., 2015). In Panel A of Figure 2, we plot the average level of 
Americans’ favorability of Middle Eastern countries. The figure shows a 6.3% drop in favorability 
                                           
23 Results are qualitatively similar when we measure the dependent variable over different return windows, such as [-
1,+3], [-1,+5], and [-1,+10]. For brevity, we omit the results from Table 7. 
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in 2002 following the 9/11 attacks, which corresponds to a 23.0% decrease relative to its 
favorability rating in 2001 (27.4%). Thus, we use the 9/11 attacks as our first natural experiment 
in which we can exploit an exogenous shock that adversely affected Americans’ favorability 
toward Middle Eastern surnames. 
 As for the second natural experiment, we utilize the French and German governments’ 
opposition to the U.S.-led Iraq War around February and March 2003. Their opposition prompted 
Americans to boycott French and German products and worsened bilateral trades between the 
United States and the two countries (Chavis and Leslie, 2009; Michaels and Zhi, 2010). Panel B 
of Figure 2 also shows supportive evidence that the average level of Americans’ favorability of 
France and Germany fell by 39.3%, reaching a record low of 41.4% in 2003 from its highest, 
80.7%, in 2002. 
 We construct a matched sample for each of our two natural experiments. Recent studies 
find that propensity score matching (PSM) is subject to the random matching problem and 
generates fragile results that are sensitive to fairly minor changes in design choices (DeFond et al., 
2016; Shipman et al., 2016). Thus, we use a coarsened exact matching (CEM) algorithm that 
outperforms PSM by achieving better covariate balance between the treatment and control groups 
(Iacus et al., 2011). 
In the 9/11 terrorist attacks setting, our treatment analysts are those who have Middle 
Eastern surnames (Middle Eastern analysts, hereafter). We define a surname as Middle Eastern if 
more than 30% of U.S. immigrants sharing the same surname are either from a Middle Eastern 
country or identified as “Arab” or “Muslim,” according to U.S. immigration records.24 The list of 
                                           
24 In untabulated tests, we use different cutoffs, such as 20%, 40%, and 50%, and find qualitatively the same results. 
When we set a cutoff higher than 40%, fewer than 10 individual analysts are identified as Middle Eastern analysts at 
the end of 2000, making our empirical analyses almost infeasible. 
24 
Middle Eastern countries includes Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. In untabulated tests, we also include South 
Asian countries, such as India and Indonesia, and find that their inclusion does not alter the 
inferences of our results. 
 We identify 16 Middle Eastern analysts at the end of year 2000. We match Middle Eastern 
analysts and control analysts on the following matching covariates: surname favorability 
(FavSurname), mean accuracy of the last forecasts for firms covered, brokerage size, forecast 
frequency, general experience, and the number of firms covered in a year. To retain a sufficient 
number of matches and to avoid the curse of dimensionality issues, we exclude firm-specific 
experience and the number of industries covered in a year from the set of matching covariates.25  
Following the CEM approach, we temporarily coarsen each of the covariates into four 
equal-sized intervals and discard any observation whose stratum does not have at least one Middle 
Eastern analyst and one control analyst (Iacus et al., 2011). Given the small number of Middle 
Eastern analysts, we conduct one-to-many matching by allowing a Middle Eastern analyst to have 
multiple control analysts that are similar on the matching covariates.26 The procedure yields a 
matched sample of 13 Middle Eastern (treatment) and 204 control analysts. Panel A of Table 8 
reports descriptive statistics for matching covariates between the two analyst groups. We find that 
none of the matching covariates are significantly different across our treatment and control analyst 
groups. 
In our second setting of the French and German governments’ opposition to the Iraq War, 
                                           
25 As a robustness check, we further include firm-specific experience and the number of industries as additional 
matching covariates and find that our results remain similar. 
26 Whenever we use a one-to-many matched sample, we compensate for the different sizes of strata by imposing CEM 
weights calculated based on the formula in Iacus et al. (2011). 
25 
we define analysts having French or German surnames as our treatment analysts (French and 
German analysts, hereafter). Given the relatively higher number of French and German analysts 
in our sample, we impose stricter conditions on the matching procedure: First, we conduct a one-
to-one matching.27 Second, we use a cutoff of 40% to define a surname as French or German. All 
other matching criteria and covariates are the same as the 9/11 setting. We conduct the matching 
at the end of 2002, which immediately precedes the French and German governments’ opposition 
to the Iraq War. Using the same set of matching covariates, we successfully identify 248 control 
analysts whose characteristics are highly analogous to those of 248 French and German analysts. 
In Panel B of Table 8, we report descriptive statistics for matching covariates between our 
treatment and control analysts. All matching covariates, except for the initial level of surname 
favorability, are insignificantly different across two groups.28  
To check the validity of our natural experiments, we investigate whether surname 
favorability significantly decreases for our treatment analysts after a shock, relative to the change 
for their control analysts. We construct the annual favorability level of an analyst’s surname using 
the most recent Gallup survey data available. In Panel C of Table 8, we estimate OLS regressions 
in which the dependent variable is the annual surname favorability (FavSurname) and the 
independent variable of interest is Treatment×Post-shock. We confine our difference-in-
differences tests to analyst-year observations in the pre- and post-shock periods with equal five-
year length, excluding those in the transition year of 2001 (2003) for the 9/11 terrorist attacks (the 
                                           
27 In untabulated tests, we also perform a one-to-many matching. Treatment analysts (248) are matched with 1,152 
control analysts. We find weaker but qualitatively similar results. 
28 In a difference-in-differences test, we focus on a time-series change in the market’s reaction to French and German 
analysts, compared to before, after French and German opposition to the Iraq War. Thus, we believe that the higher 
initial level of FavSurname for our control group is of less concern. As a robustness check, in untabulated tests, we 
coarsen FavSurname more strictly into six equal-length intervals and find similar results.    
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French and German opposition to the Iraq War) setting. We find that the coefficients on the 
interaction term between Treatment and Post-shock are significantly negative. The results suggest 
that Middle Eastern (French and German) analysts experience a significant decline in the level of 
their surname favorability after the 9/11 attacks (the French and German opposition to the Iraq 
War), compared to control analysts during contemporaneous periods. Overall, the empirical 
evidence in Panel C of Table 8 provides a further justification for using the two settings as our 
natural experiments for surname favorability. 
Next, to examine whether market responses to forecast revisions by treatment analysts 
become weaker after the shock, we carry out difference-in-differences tests using our matched 
samples. We first retrieve all forecast revisions that our treatment and control analysts have issued 
in the pre- and post-shock periods. Like in Panel C of Table 8, we exclude forecast revisions in the 
transition year of 2001 (2003) and define the pre- versus post-shock periods as 1996–2000 versus 
2002–2006 (1998–2002 vs. 2004–2008) for the 9/11 terrorist attacks (the French and German 
opposition to the Iraq War) setting. We estimate the same baseline regression model used in Table 
4, except that we replace FavSurname with Treatment, Post-shock, and Treatment×Post-shock. We 
report the results in Panel D of Table 8.29  
Consistent with our conjecture, we find negative and significant coefficients on the three-
way interaction term of Revision×Treatment×Post-shocks across all columns for two different 
matched samples. They suggest that Middle Eastern (French and German) analysts experience a 
significant decrease in the magnitude of market responses to their forecast revisions after the 9/11 
attacks (the French and German governments’ opposition to the Iraq War), as compared to their 
                                           
29 For brevity, we omit our results based on the dependent variables using different return windows, such as [-1,+3], 
[-1,+5] and [-1,+10]. In untabulated tests, we find qualitatively similar results for those windows. 
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control analysts during contemporaneous periods. 30  We believe that strong results from two 
different natural experiments, involving different sets of analysts (i.e., Middle Eastern analysts and 
European analysts), considerably strengthen our identification of the surname favorability effect.  
5. Surname Favorability, Forecast Quality, and Career Outcomes 
5.1. Forecast Accuracy, Bias, and Timeliness 
 Although we use baseline regression models that control for a number of analyst- and 
forecast-specific characteristics, including past forecast accuracy, we now directly investigate 
whether surname favorability is associated with the quality of forecast revisions, such as forecast 
accuracy, bias, and timeliness. If we find that analysts with more favorable surnames issue more 
accurate, less biased, or timelier earnings forecasts, our surname favorability effect on market 
reactions may be attributable to investors’ rational information processing that puts a greater 
weight on higher-quality forecasts. On the other hand, if forecast quality is not associated with the 
level of an analyst’s surname favorability, it will lend further support to our interpretation of the 
results that investors make biased judgments based on their subjective attitudes or perception 
(favorability) about an analyst’s surname.  
 We first examine the relation between an analyst’s surname favorability and his or her 
forecast accuracy. We measure forecast accuracy as the negative value of the absolute difference 
between an analyst’s last one-year-ahead forecast of annual earnings and the actual earnings, 
scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the forecast date. In our regression model of 
forecast accuracy, we control for firm, analyst, and forecast characteristics known to affect forecast 
                                           
30 In untabulated tests, we divide each matched sample into two subsamples by the sign of the forecast revisions. We 
find that our results are slightly stronger in the subsamples of negative forecast revisions.  
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accuracy (e.g., Clement, 1999; Kumar, 2010; Jiang et al., 2016): book-to-market ratio, brokerage 
size, days since last forecast, female analyst, forecast horizon, forecast frequency, firm size, firm-
specific experience, general experience, institutional ownership, lagged accuracy, number of 
analysts, number of firms, and number of industries.31 To exclude the effects of unobservable firm 
characteristics and time trends, we further include firm and year fixed effects in the regressions.  
 Panel A of Table 9 reports results for the accuracy tests. We find that the coefficient 
estimate of FavSurname is close to zero and statistically insignificant, regardless of the model 
specifications used. The results suggest that the positive surname favorability effect on the 
market’s reactions are due to investors’ subjective perceptions rather than rational weighting based 
on forecast quality. 
 Next, we examine the relation between surname favorability and forecast bias, which is 
measured as the difference between an analyst’s last one-year-ahead forecast of annual earnings 
and the actual earnings (i.e., signed forecast error), scaled by the stock price two trading days prior 
to the forecast date (e.g., Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). Panel B of Table 9 shows that FavSurname 
is not significantly associated with forecast bias in column (3), where control variables and fixed 
effects are added to the regression model, suggesting no relation between the two.  
 Lastly, we check another aspect of forecast quality, the timeliness of a forecast revision 
(e.g., Cooper et al., 2001) in Panel C of Table 9. We capture the timeliness of a forecast revision 
using Days since last forecast, which is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
of days elapsed since the most recent earnings forecast for a firm was issued by another analyst.32 
                                           
31 In untabulated tests, we also control for a firm’s past 12-month return (i.e., momentum) and find qualitatively the 
same results.  
32 Cooper et al. (2001) find that earnings forecasts issued by lead analysts have a greater impact on stock prices 
compared with those issued by follower analysts who tend to make forecasts immediately after the release of lead 
analysts’ forecasts. They attribute the finding to follower analysts’ free riding on the information produced by lead 
29 
We do not find evidence that the favorability of an analyst’s surname is significantly associated 
with forecast timeliness.  
 Overall, the results in Table 9 show that forecast quality does not systematically vary with 
the favorability of an analyst’s surname. It suggests that our main findings reflect investors’ biased 
information processing due to their subjective opinions about the analysts based on their 
surnames.33 
5.2. Career Outcomes 
 We now investigate the labor market consequences of analysts’ having favorable surnames. 
If investors more strongly react to analysts with more favorable surnames, it is possible that these 
analysts experience positive career outcomes and succeed in the profession.34 Furthermore, as 
Fang and Huang (2017) point out, career advancement requires not only superior job performance 
but also the favorable subjective evaluations by others. This argument suggests a possible 
interaction between performance and surname favorability. 
 In this section, we consider three different measures of analysts’ career outcomes (e.g., 
Fang and Huang, 2017): All-star equals 1 if an analyst is ranked as an all-star analyst by 
Institutional Investor magazine in the following year and 0 otherwise. Post-closure/merger 
termination equals 1 if an analyst disappears from the I/B/E/S within three years after his or her 
brokerage house goes out of business (closure) or goes through a merger and 0 otherwise.35 
                                           
analysts.  
33 We acknowledge that it is not possible to encompass the entire spectrum of forecast quality with observable forecast 
characteristics. Thus, it is still possible that surname favorability is associated with other unknown aspects of forecast 
quality or analyst ability (e.g., analysts’ ability to communicate with the management) that are value relevant, yet not 
captured in observable forecast characteristics. 
34 One possible mechanism is through investors’ higher subscriptions to the forecast reports of analysts who have 
favorable surnames.     
35 We manually complied the list of mergers and closures of brokerage houses between 1996 and 2008 by referring 
to the 1984–2005 list of brokerage mergers in Hong and Kacperzyk (2010) and the 2000–2008 list of brokerage 
30 
Covering visible stocks equals 1 if an analyst covers at least one stock that ranks in the top decile 
by total analyst coverage across all stocks in the following year and 0 otherwise.      
 We estimate pooled probit regressions in which the dependent variable is one of the three 
measures of career outcomes. We use the following independent variables of interest in the 
regression model: High FavSurname equals 1 if an analyst has a surname that ranks in the top 
tercile of surname favorability among all analysts in a year and 0 otherwise. Mean Accuracy is the 
mean accuracy of an analyst’s last forecasts issued for all firms he or she covered in a year, and 
Mean Accuracy×High FavSurname is the interaction term between the two variables. We control 
for brokerage size, female analyst, general experience, number of firms, number of industries, and 
year fixed effects (e.g., Fang and Huang, 2017).36 Since an analyst’s career outcomes are defined 
every year, we use observations at the analyst-year level.  
Table 10 reports results for the career outcome regressions. Across all columns for three 
different measure of career outcomes, we find that coefficients on Mean Accuracy are positive 
(negative) and statistically significant for All-star and Covering visible stocks (Post-
closure/merger termination).37 This is consistent with prior findings that forecast accuracy is 
positively associated with analysts’ career outcomes (e.g., Mikhail et al., 1999). As for surname 
favorability, coefficients on High FavSurname are not significant across most of the six columns. 
However, interestingly, we find that coefficients on the interaction term Mean Accuracy×High 
                                           
closures in Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012). As a robustness check, we confine our test to brokerage house closures only, 
where analysts have no option but to get a new job at a different brokerage house. In untabulated tests, we find that 
results remain inferentially the same as those in Table 10.  
36 In untabulated tests, we find that results remain qualitatively the same when we additionally control for brokerage 
house fixed effects in the regression models. 
37 In columns (3) and (4), we only estimate the regression models using an analyst’s yearly observations from year t-
1 to t+3, where year t includes the date of his or her brokerage house’s merger or closure. This is to more clearly 
capture the analyst’s job termination resulting from an unexpected shock, such as redundancies (Fang and Huang, 
2017). We include an analyst’s observation in year t-1 to capture a job termination occurring in year t. 
31 
Surname are statistically significant and positive (negative) for good (bad) career outcomes, such 
as All-star (Post-closure/merger termination). The results suggest that surname favorability has a 
complementary relation with forecasting performance, and, thus, acts as a catalyst in furthering 
analysts’ career progression.  
6. Additional Tests 
In this section, we summarize the results of additional tests reported in the Online 
Appendix. First, we identify underlying factors that form the favorability of a surname. We find 
that surname favorability is positively associated with the ethnic and linguistic similarities between 
the United States and an analyst’s country of origin reflected in his or her surname, whereas it is 
negatively associated with the foreignness of an analyst’s name, cultural distance, and the level of 
perceived corruption in the countries associated with the surname. Further, we find that the residual 
component of surname favorability not explained by the aforementioned factors still has 
significant explanatory power for investor reactions to forecast revisions. 
Second, we examine the impact of surname favorability on post-revision price drifts 
(Gleason and Lee, 2003). Using a subsample of firms and analyst forecasts that has significant 
drifts, we find that surname favorability is associated with a weaker underreaction to forecast 
revisions, suggesting that surname favorability also affects price efficiency.   
Lastly, we bolster the robustness of our findings by using an alternative measure and data 
source. We use a name-based ethnicity classification provided by OnoMap, which derives data 
from telephone directories and electoral registers in 26 countries (Mateos et al., 2011). We find 
that our results are robust to alternative measures of surname or full name favorability, constructed 
using the ethnicity classifications in OnoMap.  
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7. Summary and Conclusion 
 We examine whether investors’ favorability of an analyst’s surname affects their reaction 
to the analyst’s forecast revisions. Using U.S. historical immigration records and Gallup survey 
data, we construct a measure of surname favorability and find strong evidence that analysts with 
more favorable surnames elicit stronger market reactions to their forecast revisions. The result is 
consistent with investors’ biasing their judgments in an attempt to seek consistency between their 
perception of an analyst’s surname and their evaluation of the analyst’s forecast quality, as 
predicted by the theory of motivated reasoning in the psychology literature. 
 We strengthen our identification of the surname favorability effect using two natural 
experiments, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the French and German opposition to the Iraq War, both 
of which adversely affected Americans’ perceptions of certain countries and thus certain surnames. 
Further, we find that a favorable perception of an analyst’s surname is not associated with the 
analyst’s forecast quality, such as accuracy, bias, and timeliness. Lastly, we find that surname 
favorability is a complement to forecasting performance, helping analysts proper in their 
profession, and is negatively associated with the post-revision price drifts when there is a 
significant underreaction to forecast revisions. 
 Our study sheds light on a new aspect of a name, the favorability of a surname, which 
varies over time, unlike other static name traits, such as ethnicity and foreignness. We demonstrate 
that surname favorability not only influences people’s information processing in the capital market 
but also leads to different labor market consequences for professionals. We do not find clear 
evidence of market over- or underreaction related to surname favorability in the overall sample. 
Thus, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that our findings reflect investors’ rational 
response. Using evidence from other related economic settings, future research may determine 
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more clearly whether market response to surname favorability reflects irrational or rational 
investor behavior.  
Another interesting avenue for future research would be to determine whether the effect 
of surname favorability persists out-of-sample. The market impact of surname favorability could 
be reinforced as in a Keynesian beauty contest (Keynes, 1936) if investors make decisions based 
on what they think the market’s reaction to an analyst’s forecast revision will be based on the 
analyst’s surname. However, the effect can also weaken over time if investors become more aware 
of the mispricing associated with surname favorability and trade against it to exploit that 
mispricing.  
Future research may also explore other types of name-induced bias. For example, the 
market may perceive an individual who shares their name with a popular professional athlete or a 
celebrity more favorably. Lastly, it may be interesting to examine the effects of name-induced bias 
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Appendix A 
Distribution of countries of origin for the surnames of the U.S. equity analysts 
 
Country of origin 
Percentage of analysts whose surname 
is associated with at least one 
U.S. immigrant from the country 
Mean percentage of U.S. immigrants 
from the country, conditional on their surnames 
identical to the analysts’ in column (1) 
  (1) (2) 
Afghanistan 0.40 0.44 
Africa 33.68 0.37 
Albania 5.73 0.61 
Algeria 0.82 0.09 
Arab World 8.96 0.75 
Argentina 24.55 0.18 
Armenia 18.51 0.38 
Asia 11.02 0.76 
Australia 40.92 0.17 
Austria 60.26 1.45 
Austrian 2.39 0.02 
Barbados 4.44 0.01 
Belgium 42.31 0.76 
Bermuda 15.46 0.05 
Bolivia 2.01 0.04 
Bosnia 7.90 0.11 
Brazil 30.46 0.25 
Bulgaria 12.65 0.30 
Burma 0.36 0.12 
Canada 65.08 1.52 
Central America 0.80 0.01 
Chile 21.65 0.14 
China 27.45 10.42 
Colombia 16.12 0.17 
Costa Rica 7.38 0.06 
Croatia 25.18 0.68 
Cuba 38.65 0.54 
Cyprus 0.20 0.04 
Czechoslovakia 48.88 1.41 
Denmark 43.51 0.64 
Dominican Republic 8.77 0.11 
Ecuador 3.66 0.10 
Egypt 6.93 0.96 
El Salvador 0.89 0.02 
Estonia 15.30 0.24 
Ethiopia 1.41 0.02 
Finland 36.24 0.67 
France 70.99 3.06 
Germany 84.94 13.79 
Great Britain 86.53 27.68 
Greece 39.98 1.25 
Grenada 0.04 0.00 
Guatemala 3.14 0.05 
Haiti 5.35 0.11 
Hispanic 0.44 0.04 
Honduras 13.65 0.11 
Hungary 53.01 1.98 
Iceland 6.36 0.02 
India 23.17 3.05 
Indonesia 1.00 0.89 
Iran 2.48 0.39 
Iraq 3.21 2.53 
Ireland 71.30 10.71 
Israel 18.06 0.82 
Italy 67.84 9.18 
Jamaica 17.89 0.03 
Japan 16.99 1.42 
Jewish 60.46 7.67 
Jordan 1.02 0.99 
Korea 2.52 0.59 
Latin America 31.07 0.44 
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Latvia 17.73 0.28 
Lebanon 2.52 0.37 
Liberia 5.73 0.01 
Lithuania 27.56 0.48 
Luxembourg 0.05 0.03 
Macedonia 2.96 0.15 
Malaysia 7.31 0.29 
Mexico 33.88 0.36 
Mongolia 1.74 0.19 
Montenegro 6.27 0.13 
Morocco 1.25 0.79 
Muslim 0.44 0.63 
Native American 62.06 4.38 
Netherlands 60.48 2.27 
New Zealand 15.30 0.02 
Nicaragua 4.41 0.02 
Norway 49.40 1.03 
Pacific Islander 20.98 0.17 
Pakistan 1.27 3.38 
Palestine 5.33 0.12 
Panama 19.83 0.05 
Paraguay 1.03 0.07 
Peru 10.30 0.06 
Philippines 29.51 0.17 
Poland 57.74 2.90 
Polynesia 2.86 0.02 
Portugal 32.14 0.75 
Puerto Rico 32.31 0.48 
Romania 40.28 0.99 
Russia 62.00 3.40 
Samoa 0.56 0.03 
Scandinavia 61.62 2.46 
Senegal 0.34 0.19 
Serbia 15.19 0.26 
Singapore 1.14 0.02 
Slovenia 23.04 0.45 
Somalia 0.02 0.03 
South Africa 24.71 0.06 
South America 4.33 0.01 
Spain 62.60 1.90 
Sudan 1.90 0.07 
Sweden 55.93 1.44 
Switzerland 47.08 0.95 
Syria 22.90 1.44 
Thailand 0.45 0.11 
Tunisia 0.45 0.17 
Turkey 24.44 0.93 
USA 91.01 18.90 
Ukraine 6.18 0.04 
Unidentifiable 77.52 2.13 
Uruguay 4.62 0.03 
Venezuela 22.03 0.22 
Vietnam 1.81 0.25 
West Indies 11.89 0.02 
Yugoslavia 9.05 0.14 
 
This appendix shows summary statistics and a distribution of 116 countries of origin for the surnames of U.S. equity 
analysts over the sample period between 1996 and 2014. We obtain the U.S. historical immigration records of 
passengers arriving in the port of New York between 1820 and 1957 from ancestry.com. For 3,983 unique surnames 
that are associated with 5,516 individual analysts in the sample, we collect 13,353,663 immigration records without a 
missing nationality. We reclassify 1,629 original nationalities in the raw immigration record files into 116 countries 
of origin, following Pan, Siegel, and Wang (2017). We exclude USA, Unidentifiable, and other uninformative country 
classifications that indicate geographic regions (e.g., Africa, Arab World, Asia, and Central America) or ethnic groups 





Examples of the U.S. equity analysts’ surnames  
 
  Favorability of an analyst’s surname (FavSurname) 
  Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
No. of unique surnames = 398 398 399 398 398 399 398 399 398 398 
Mean of FavSurname (%) = 50.1 66.5 72.8 76.1 78.6 80.4 82.3 85.2 87.3 88.7 
  (Least favorable)              (Most favorable) 
Surnames 
Agah Aydin Alling Bout Klauer Culp Beardsley Brennan Wooten Thackray 
Coiro Zale Pfeifer Loff Lorenz Thind Logue Brundage Bacon Willoughby 
Franqui Jakubik Dan Hasse Nadol Beago Keaney Moran Wilkin Garvey 
Crabs Teitelbaum Hackman Philippi Damasco Notardonato Bowyer Myers Mohan Summers 
Vucenovic Heikkinen Pinchot Schneider Schlang Tenbrink Murchie Dickson Gould Billingsley 
Aftahi Blaustein Szymczak Hanus Pitzer Blaeser Lindberg Stanley Aney McIlree 
Ghazi Min Fontana Bauer Albrecht Hardt Shepler Dann Lennan Crowell 
Georgieva Zinsmeister Solotar Wlodarczak Augenthaler Noto Ederer Corty Howard Whelan 
Hormozi Karim Ladha Bergman Helmig Daubenspeck Lipman Crooks McGinnis Holmstead 
Manlowe Klugman Groshans Prehn Pantazis Marx Purvis Hand Baugh Barrett 
 
This appendix shows 10 surnames of U.S. equity analysts across deciles of surname favorability (FavSurname). We rank 3,983 unique analyst surnames into deciles 
using the mean favorability of a surname over the sample period from 1996 to 2014. Each decile contains approximately 400 unique surnames. We report 10 analyst 







Variable name Description Source 
Variables of interest 
FavSurname Americans' favorability of an analyst’s surname, measured as the weighted average of 
favorability ratings for the analyst’s countries of origin that are associated with his or 
her surname through the nationalities of the U.S. immigrants. The favorability rating is 
the percentage of survey respondents who answered “Very Favorable” or “Mostly 
Favorable” to the following question in a Gallup survey: “I’d like your overall opinion 
of some foreign countries. Is your overall opinion of the following country very 
favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” Most recent 
favorability ratings are used as of each forecast date. Countries with non-missing 
favorability ratings are assigned a weight based on the frequency of nationalities that the 




Treatment Indicator variable for an analyst who has a Middle Eastern (French or German) surname 
in the natural experiment setting of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (the French and German 
governments’ opposition to the Iraq War). A surname is defined as Middle Eastern if 
more than 30% of the U.S. immigrants with the surname came from Middle Eastern 
countries, such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen, or identified as Arab or Muslim. A 
surname is defined as French or German if more than 40% of the U.S. immigrants with 
the surname came from France or Germany  
IBES, 
Immigration 
Post-shock An indicator variable for a forecast revision issued after September 11, 2001 (February 
14, 2003) in the natural experiment setting of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (the French and 
German governments’ opposition to the Iraq War) 
IBES 
Revision The forecast revision, measured as the difference between the current earnings forecast 




Accuracy A negative value of the absolute difference between an analyst’s last one-year-ahead 
earnings forecast and the actual earnings, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior 
to the forecast date 
CRSP, IBES 
All-star A dummy variable equal to 1 if an analyst is ranked as an all-star analyst in the next 
year’s Institutional Investor magazine and 0 otherwise 
IBES, II 
BHAR [+m, +n] Size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return over the next six-month or one-year 
window, starting from trading day m (m = +2 or 11) and ending on the n-th trading day 
(n = +127 or 253), where trading day 0 is the forecast revision date. Size-decile 
breakpoints are computed at the beginning of every calendar quarter using all NYSE 
firms. Benchmark return is the equal-weighted return for all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
firms in the same size-decile portfolio 
CRSP 
CAR [-1,+n] The size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return over the window starting one trading day 
before and ending on the n-th trading day (n = +1, 3, 5, and 10) following a forecast 
revision date. Size-decile breakpoints are computed at the beginning of every calendar 
quarter using all NYSE firms. Benchmark return is the equal-weighted return for all 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms in the same size-decile portfolio 
CRSP 
Covering visible stocks A dummy variable equal to 1 if an analyst covers at least one stock that ranks in the top 
decile by total analyst coverage in the following year and 0 otherwise  
IBES 
Forecast bias An analyst’s last one-year-ahead earnings forecast for the fiscal year minus the actual 
earnings, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the forecast date. 
CRSP, IBES 
Post-closure/merger termination A dummy variable equal to 1 if an analyst disappears from the I/B/E/S within 3 years 
after the brokerage house he or she works for goes out of business (i.e., closure) or goes 




Appendix C (Continued) 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable name Description Source 
Control variables   
Book-to-market The ratio of book equity to market equity for a firm, measured at the most recent 
December preceding the forecast date 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
Brokerage size The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts in a brokerage house in a year IBES 
Days since last forecast The natural logarithm of one plus the number of days elapsed since the most recent 
earnings forecast for a firm was issued by another analyst 
IBES 
Female analyst A dummy variable equal to 1 if an analyst is female and 0 otherwise IBES, Nelson 
Forecast horizon The natural logarithm of one plus the number of days between a firm’s earnings 
announcement date and an analyst's earnings forecast date for the firm 
IBES 
Forecast frequency The natural logarithm of one plus the number of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts an 
analyst issues in a year 
IBES 
Firm size The natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalization (in thousands) measured at the 
end of the month prior to an analyst's forecast date. 
CRSP, IBES 
Firm-specific experience The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years an analyst has issued one-year-
ahead earnings forecasts for a firm 
IBES 
General experience The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years an analyst has appeared in I/B/E/S IBES 
Institutional ownership The percentage of shares held by institutions in the most recent quarter-end 13F filing 13F 
Lagged accuracy One-year lagged accuracy, defined as the accuracy of an analyst’s last earnings forecast 
for a firm in the preceding year 
CRSP, IBES 
Momentum The past 12-month return for a firm, measured at the end of the prior month of the 
forecast date 
CRSP 
Number of analysts The number of analysts following a firm in a year IBES 
Number of firms The number of firms an analyst follows in a year IBES 
Number of industries The number of (two-digit SIC code) industries an analyst follows in a year IBES 
 
This appendix provides the variable definitions. We construct variables using the following data sources: Amazon M
echanical Turk (AMT) platform, Compustat, Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), Factiva, Gallup 
Analytics (Gallup), Institutional Investor magazine (II), Nelson’s directory (Nelson), Thomson Reuters’ 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES), Thomson Reuters’ Institutional 13F Holdings file (13F), and the U.S. 








This figure shows the average level of Americans’ favorability toward foreign countries during the sample period 
between 1996 and 2014. Favorability is measured as the total percentage of survey respondents who answer “Very 
Favorable” or “Mostly Favorable” to the following question in a Gallup survey: “I’d like your overall opinion of some 
foreign countries. Is your overall opinion of the following country very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly 
unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” 
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Figure 2 
Changes in Americans’ favorability of foreign countries 
 











































This figure plots the time-series change in Americans’ favorability of Middle Eastern countries around the 9/11 
terrorist attacks (September 2001) and of France and Germany around the French and German governments’ 
opposition to the U.S. troops’ invasion of Iraq (March 2003). Panel A reports the average American’s favorability of 
Middle Eastern countries. Panel B reports the average Americans’ favorability of France and Germany. We require 
countries to be covered in two Gallup surveys that immediately preceded and followed the event date in each panel. 
We use data in the closest year when the favorability rating is missing in a year.
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for Americans’ favorability of foreign countries 
 















Afghanistan 2.9 18.9 43.8 28.7 5.7 Kuwait 5.7 41.1 29.6 12.3 11.3 
Australia 43.9 45.2 3.3 2.0 5.6 Libya 2.4 17.1 41.8 24.8 13.9 
Brazil 11.1 55.2 13.9 3.7 16.1 Mexico 11.6 47.9 24.9 10.3 5.3 
Canada 45.0 45.6 4.4 1.7 3.3 North Korea 2.3 12.3 35.5 42.7 7.2 
China 5.9 35.7 35.8 15.9 6.7 Pakistan 2.5 21.2 45.5 22.3 8.5 
Colombia 4.2 22.2 40.2 19.2 14.2 Palestine 2.4 14.9 43.6 26.9 12.2 
Cuba 3.7 24.3 42.6 22.4 7.0 Philippines 10.4 51.8 20.7 5.8 11.3 
Egypt 7.8 47.1 25.8 7.3 12.0 Poland 17.1 60.8 8.2 1.3 12.6 
France 15.4 48.7 20.4 9.5 6.0 Russia 5.6 43.9 32.4 10.9 7.2 
Germany 18.9 58.4 11.5 4.5 6.7 Saudi Arabia 4.1 30.3 40.5 17.6 7.5 
Great Britain 40.2 47.4 5.2 2.4 4.8 South Africa 11.2 46.3 23.6 8.9 10.0 
Greece 11.3 51.2 23.5 5.2 8.8 South Korea 11.3 47.2 22.7 9.0 9.8 
India 10.2 55.1 19.3 5.7 9.7 Spain 16.1 57.3 8.1 2.7 15.8 
Indonesia 6.1 50.7 22.8 4.8 15.6 Syria 2.4 15.8 40.9 25.3 15.6 
Iran 1.8 9.1 42.3 41.0 5.8 Taiwan 10.3 49.2 17.8 6.8 15.9 
Iraq 2.3 12.9 38.5 41.4 4.9 Turkey 6.5 48.6 23.6 5.8 15.5 
Israel 20.0 45.3 19.9 7.4 7.4 Ukraine 8.7 57.6 15.2 3.1 15.4 
Italy 21.4 58.0 7.1 3.4 10.1 Venezuela 7.0 32.3 28.0 19.1 13.6 
Japan 19.6 57.7 12.1 4.6 6.0 Vietnam 5.1 37.6 31.7 13.0 12.6 
Jordan 7.5 40.6 27.3 9.5 15.1 Yemen 1.9 18.6 37.0 19.4 23.1 
Kenya 4.8 36.7 27.8 9.6 21.1 Yugoslavia 2.1 16.6 45.5 26.7 9.1 
 
This table shows summary statistics for Americans’ favorability of foreign countries from Gallup Analytics. Favorability is rated on a five-point Likert scale of 
Very Favorable, Mostly Favorable, Mostly Unfavorable, Very Unfavorable, and Others. The “Others” response includes uninformative rating items, such as “Don’t 





Time variation in the weighted measure of surname favorability 
 
Panel A: A real-life example of the most and least variable analyst surnames 
  Most variable surname Least variable surname 
Analyst surname:  “Tournier” “Garcea” 
  Weighted measure of surname favorability, % (in year) 
Highest level 79.14 (in 2002) 74.38 (in 2002) 
Lowest level 44.01 (in 2003) 73.64 (in 2007) 
Spread of FavSurname (highest - lowest) (%) 35.13 0.74 
      
Standard Deviation of FavSurname 0.194 0.003 
Three most common nationalities in the U.S. immigrants (%) France (63.64) Italy (47.06) 
  Netherlands (23.82) Spain (28.99) 
  Germany (3.13) Cuba (5.04) 
 
 
Panel B: Mean spread of surname favorability for the sample analysts’ surnames  
  Mean spread of the weighted measure of surname favorability (FavSurname) 
  Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
No. of unique surnames = 451 333 339 307 223 258 319 284 237 276 
Mean Std. Dev. of FavSurname = 0.004 0.013 0.020 0.025 0.029 0.032 0.037 0.046 0.063 0.099 
  (Least variable)       (Most variable) 
Mean spread of FavSurname            
(highest - lowest) (%) 1.11 3.69 5.26 6.79 8.22 8.58 9.27 13.17 20.8 28.58 
 
This table shows descriptive evidence for the time variation of our weighted measure of surname favorability (FavSurname). In Panel A, we illustrate a real-life 
example of the most and least variable analyst surnames in our sample. The most and least variable surnames are determined based on the standard deviation of 
yearly mean levels of surname favorability (FavSurname), calculated at the surname level. In Panel B, we rank analysts’ surnames into deciles by their standard 
deviation of yearly mean levels of surname favorability. We report the mean spread (i.e., highest – lowest) of our measure of surname favorability (FavSurname) 





Summary statistics for variables 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics        
Variable Mean Std dev 10th pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th pctl 90th pctl 
Variables of Interest 
FavSurname 0.784 0.113 0.626 0.747 0.808 0.870 0.889 
Revision -0.002 0.013 -0.011 -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.006 
Dependent Variables 
Accuracy -0.013 0.026 -0.030 -0.011 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 
All-star 0.108 0.311 0 0 0 0 1 
CAR [-1,+1] -0.002 0.070 -0.078 -0.031 -0.001 0.031 0.074 
CAR [-1,+3] -0.002 0.079 -0.089 -0.037 0.000 0.036 0.085 
CAR [-1,+5] -0.002 0.085 -0.097 -0.041 0.000 0.041 0.093 
CAR [-1,+10] -0.001 0.098 -0.113 -0.049 0.000 0.050 0.111 
Covering visible stocks 0.824 0.381 0 1 1 1 1 
Forecast bias 0.003 0.025 -0.011 -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.020 
Post-closure/merger termination 0.474 0.499 0 0 0 1 1 
Control Variables 
Book-to-market 0.552 0.437 0.149 0.258 0.440 0.714 1.062 
Brokerage size 3.857 0.995 2.565 3.178 4.007 4.673 4.942 
Days since last forecast 1.781 1.152 0.693 0.693 1.386 2.639 3.584 
Female analyst 0.125 0.331 0 0 0 0 1 
Forecast horizon 5.014 0.689 4.304 4.654 5.236 5.557 5.684 
Forecast frequency 4.334 0.563 3.638 3.989 4.344 4.691 5.037 
Firm size 14.909 1.775 12.613 13.620 14.849 16.205 17.246 
Firm-specific experience 1.694 0.515 1.099 1.386 1.609 2.079 2.398 
General experience 2.233 0.537 1.386 1.792 2.303 2.639 2.890 
Institutional ownership 0.703 0.202 0.412 0.585 0.736 0.854 0.945 
Lagged accuracy -0.005 0.013 -0.011 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Momentum 0.138 0.485 -0.403 -0.157 0.089 0.345 0.683 
Number of analysts 19.345 10.859 6 11 18 26 35 
Number of firms 17.730 7.295 10 13 17 21 27 
Number of industries 3.726 2.392 1 2 3 5 7 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Summary statistics for variables 
 
Panel B: Analyst, forecast, and firm characteristics conditional on favorability of analysts’ surnames 
  High FavSurname  Low FavSurname  Test of differences 
  N = 381,470  N = 381,310    
Variable Mean Median  Mean Median   t-statistic z-statistic 
FavSurname 0.863 0.870  0.705 0.747   (48.24)*** (756.36)*** 
Accuracy -0.012 -0.004  -0.013 -0.004   (1.18) (9.98)*** 
Forecast bias 0.003 0.000  0.004 0.000   (-0.10) (3.61)*** 
Book-to-market 0.563 0.450  0.541 0.431   (2.61)*** (25.63)*** 
Brokerage size 3.834 3.970  3.879 4.025   (-1.21) (-21.36)*** 
Days since last forecast 1.765 1.386  1.797 1.386   (-2.00)** (-14.69)*** 
Female analyst 0.115 0  0.136 0   (-1.63) (-27.00)*** 
Forecast horizon 5.022 5.236  5.006 5.226   (4.68)*** (11.02)*** 
Forecast frequency 4.342 4.344  4.327 4.331   (0.62) (9.41)*** 
Firm size 14.953 14.886  14.865 14.812   (2.13)** (20.74)*** 
Firm-specific experience 1.700 1.609  1.689 1.609   (1.04) (12.30)*** 
General experience 2.258 2.303  2.207 2.303   (3.04)*** (41.29)*** 
Institutional ownership 0.715 0.748  0.691 0.723   (6.57)*** (49.60)*** 
Lagged accuracy -0.005 -0.001  -0.005 -0.002   (1.66)* (6.53)*** 
Momentum 0.129 0.083  0.147 0.094   (-4.78)*** (-12.70)*** 
Number of analysts 19.543 18  19.146 18   (1.44) (16.33)*** 
Number of firms 17.607 17  17.854 16   (-0.87) (2.05)** 
Number of industries 3.698 3  3.754 3   (-0.63) (-8.38)*** 
 
This table shows summary statistics for our main variables in the sample. In Panel A, we report summary statistics for 
variables over the sample period from 1996 to 2014. In Panel B, we compare analyst, forecast, and firm characteristics 
across two groups of surname favorability. We divide our sample into two groups by the sample-median favorability 
of analysts’ surnames (FavSurname). t-statistics for mean difference tests are based on standard errors clustered by 
analyst. z-statistics for Wilcoxon signed-rank median difference tests do not account for intra-group correlations in 
residuals per analyst. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix C. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 
Market reaction regression estimates 
 
Panel A: Main results         
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revision 0.888*** 0.773*** 0.919*** 0.759*** 0.968*** 0.854*** 0.902*** 0.566* 
 (7.308) (2.886) (7.032) (2.704) (7.513) (2.923) (6.797) (1.800) 
Revision×FavSurname 0.413*** 0.431*** 0.451*** 0.472*** 0.412** 0.443*** 0.465*** 0.507*** 
 (2.660) (2.804) (2.707) (2.878) (2.507) (2.696) (2.739) (2.988) 
FavSurname 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.960) (0.787) (1.183) (0.992) (0.571) (0.468) (0.273) (0.299) 
Revision×Book-to-market  -0.296***  -0.305***  -0.289***  -0.283*** 
  (-13.697)  (-12.978)  (-11.671)  (-10.324) 
Revision×Brokerage size  0.127***  0.128***  0.138***  0.145*** 
  (7.417)  (7.053)  (7.546)  (7.486) 
Revision×Days since last forecast  0.050***  0.069***  0.082***  0.095*** 
  (5.094)  (6.417)  (7.097)  (7.437) 
Revision×Female analyst  0.010  0.072  0.067  0.107 
  (0.151)  (1.099)  (1.063)  (1.602) 
Revision×Forecast horizon  0.115***  0.120***  0.115***  0.137*** 
  (6.987)  (6.427)  (5.549)  (5.864) 
Revision×Forecast frequency  -0.273***  -0.268***  -0.285***  -0.293*** 
  (-5.724)  (-5.366)  (-5.685)  (-5.553) 
Revision×Firm size  -0.005  -0.004  0.001  0.016 
  (-0.387)  (-0.295)  (0.075)  (0.961) 
Revision×Firm-specific experience  -0.071**  -0.065*  -0.057  -0.040 
  (-2.121)  (-1.828)  (-1.532)  (-1.030) 
Revision×General experience  0.080**  0.094**  0.073*  0.081** 
  (2.323)  (2.550)  (1.918)  (1.991) 
Revision×Institutional ownership  1.081***  1.103***  1.049***  0.980*** 
  (17.308)  (16.223)  (14.641)  (12.328) 
Revision×Lagged accuracy  9.223***  10.237***  10.166***  10.816*** 
  (19.263)  (19.170)  (17.341)  (17.577) 
Revision×Momentum  0.521***  0.594***  0.672***  0.764*** 
  (17.977)  (18.578)  (19.534)  (20.013) 
Revision×Number of analysts  -0.006***  -0.009***  -0.011***  -0.016*** 
  (-3.103)  (-4.108)  (-4.518)  (-6.102) 
Revision×Number of firms  -0.007*  -0.009**  -0.008**  -0.009** 
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  (-1.886)  (-2.235)  (-2.038)  (-2.257) 
Revision×Number of industries  0.071***  0.077***  0.081***  0.089*** 
  (8.447)  (8.619)  (9.038)  (9.391) 
Book-to-market  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.315)  (0.911)  (-0.014)  (0.832) 
Brokerage size  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (-0.456)  (-0.360)  (-0.340)  (0.595) 
Days since last forecast  0.000  -0.000  -0.000**  -0.000*** 
  (0.416)  (-1.353)  (-1.971)  (-3.214) 
Female analyst  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.588)  (0.764)  (0.850)  (0.631) 
Forecast horizon  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
  (13.728)  (12.358)  (11.292)  (7.912) 
Forecast frequency  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001*  -0.001*** 
  (-2.304)  (-2.130)  (-1.754)  (-2.576) 
Firm size  -0.012***  -0.014***  -0.017***  -0.023*** 
  (-35.020)  (-37.759)  (-40.486)  (-45.713) 
Firm-specific experience  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.664)  (-0.505)  (-0.672)  (-1.122) 
General experience  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (-0.384)  (-0.750)  (-0.125)  (0.422) 
Institutional ownership  -0.009***  -0.008***  -0.010***  -0.011*** 
  (-8.745)  (-7.259)  (-7.743)  (-7.421) 
Lagged accuracy  0.015  0.017  0.015  0.012 
  (1.550)  (1.481)  (1.162)  (0.784) 
Momentum  -0.000  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.004*** 
  (-1.528)  (-5.204)  (-7.346)  (-9.167) 
Number of analysts  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-1.439)  (-1.239)  (-0.671)  (-0.750) 
Number of firms  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (1.311)  (1.343)  (0.336)  (0.431) 
Number of industries  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.884)  (0.899)  (1.198)  (1.348) 
Intercept 0.003*** 0.171*** 0.004*** 0.208*** 0.004*** 0.243*** 0.006*** 0.330*** 
 (3.773) (33.759) (4.276) (36.277) (4.394) (39.106) (5.165) (44.307) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.77 9.74 7.16 9.20 6.61 8.71 5.65 8.00 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Market reaction regression estimates 
 
Panel B: Using analysts’ last forecasts for a firm-year only 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revision×FavSurname 0.411** 0.441** 0.349 0.368* 0.401* 0.428* 0.597** 0.645** 
 (1.984) (2.260) (1.484) (1.682) (1.647) (1.868) (2.139) (2.500) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 213,549 213,549 213,549 213,549 213,549 213,549 213,549 213,549 
Adjusted R2 (%) 9.68 11.51 9.47 11.27 9.14 10.96 8.58 10.56 
 
Panel C: Excluding forecasts made on days when other analysts’ forecasts, quarterly earnings, or managerial forecasts for the firm are released 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revision×FavSurname 0.286* 0.275* 0.405** 0.405** 0.334* 0.355** 0.308 0.364 
 (1.959) (1.927) (2.299) (2.386) (1.806) (1.961) (1.323) (1.622) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 209,467 209,467 209,467 209,467 209,467 209,467 209,467 209,467 
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.45 4.15 3.24 4.07 3.21 4.20 3.1 4.45 
 
Panel D: Defining the level of favorability using different survey response items 
Coefficient estimates on Revision×FavSurname (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Using “very favorable (%)” only 0.588*** 0.424*** 0.658*** 0.482*** 0.624*** 0.452** 0.693*** 0.520*** 
 (3.551) (2.578) (3.727) (2.766) (3.501) (2.559) (3.727) (2.838) 
Using a composite score 0.248*** 0.206*** 0.275*** 0.232*** 0.262*** 0.223*** 0.296*** 0.261*** 
 (3.720) (3.117) (3.867) (3.299) (3.690) (3.151) (3.993) (3.543) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
 
Panel E: Using dominant origins of a surname only 
Coefficient estimates on Revision×FavSurname (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Using the most dominant origin 0.324** 0.333*** 0.354** 0.360*** 0.302** 0.315** 0.323** 0.340** 
 (2.482) (2.581) (2.518) (2.594) (2.180) (2.249) (2.265) (2.345) 
Using three most dominant origins 0.407*** 0.426*** 0.444*** 0.465*** 0.400** 0.431*** 0.442*** 0.484*** 
 (2.696) (2.850) (2.744) (2.915) (2.499) (2.684) (2.677) (2.924) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Market reaction regression estimates 
 
This table shows the estimates of pooled OLS market reaction regressions. In Panel A, we estimate the baseline OLS 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window 
from trading day -1 to trading day n (n = 1, 3, 5, and 10), where trading day 0 is an analyst’s forecast revision date. 
FavSurname is Americans’ favorability of an analyst’s surname. Revision is the difference between an analyst’s 
current and preceding earnings forecast for a firm, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the current 
forecast date. Panels B, C, D, and E report results from estimating the same OLS regressions whose model 
specifications are identical to those in Panel A, but each panel is different from Panel A in terms of either a sample 
composition or a measurement of FavSurname. In Panel B, we estimate the regressions using the subsample of analysts’ 
last forecasts for each firm-fiscal year. In Panel C, we exclude forecasts made on days when other analysts’ forecasts, 
the firm’s quarterly earnings, or the firm’s managerial forecasts are released. In Panel D, we use different items from 
Gallup surveys to measure the level of Americans’ favorability: we either use the most extreme rating scale, “Very 
Favorable,” only or make a composite score of favorability using all four rating scales. The composite score is 
computed as 4 × (%Very Favorable) + 3 × (%Mostly Favorable) + 2 × (%Mostly Unfavorable) + 1 × (%Very 
Unfavorable), following Hwang (2011). In Panel E, we calculate FavSurname by considering one or three of the most 
dominant countries of origin associated with an analyst’s surname. In parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-
statistics based on standard errors clustered by analyst. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5 
Falsification test: Market reaction regression estimates 
 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revision 1.187*** 1.070*** 1.185*** 1.049*** 1.196*** 1.096*** 1.145*** 0.795** 
 (11.073) (4.074) (10.236) (3.792) (10.290) (3.758) (9.263) (2.561) 
Revision×FavSurname (P) 0.035 0.118 0.124 0.210 0.137 0.219 0.176 0.251 
 (0.227) (0.794) (0.751) (1.356) (0.825) (1.410) (1.001) (1.545) 
FavSurname (P) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.374) (0.899) (0.524) (1.071) (0.557) (1.117) (0.407) (1.065) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 740,566 740,566 740,566 740,566 740,566 740,566 740,566 740,566 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.77 9.74 7.17 9.22 6.63 8.73 5.69 8.03 
 
This table shows the results from falsification tests for the market reaction regression estimates. We estimate the 
baseline OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over 
the window from trading day -1 to trading day n (n = 1, 3, 5, and 10), where trading day 0 is an analyst’s forecast 
revision date. Revision is the difference between an analyst’s current and preceding earnings forecast for a firm, scaled 
by the stock price two trading days prior to the current forecast date. FavSurname (P) is a placebo measure of surname 
favorability, measured as the weighted average of favorability ratings for falsified countries of origin. Falsified country 
of origin is the country that appears immediately after the true country of origin in the alphabetically ordered list of 
116 countries in Appendix A (e.g., Germany → Great Britain). Control variables and fixed effects are identical to those 
in Panel A of Table 4. In parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by 
analyst. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in 




Subsample analyses for market reaction regression estimates 
 
Panel A: Investor sophistication 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
High institutional ownership 
Revision×FavSurname 0.279 0.315 0.312 0.353 0.352 0.410* 0.336 0.406 
 (1.093) (1.333) (1.177) (1.418) (1.336) (1.651) (1.239) (1.572) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 
Adjusted R2 (%) 9.11 11.42 8.35 10.7 7.61 10.17 6.47 9.21 
         
Low institutional ownership 
Revision×FavSurname 0.425*** 0.489*** 0.467*** 0.532*** 0.387** 0.456*** 0.504*** 0.577*** 
 (2.915) (3.360) (2.944) (3.333) (2.402) (2.739) (2.854) (3.090) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.95 10.60 8.41% 10.1 8.01 9.77 7.31 9.39 
         
Panel B: Difficulty in inferring countries of origin 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Origins easily inferred by name 
Revision×FavSurname 0.481** 0.482** 0.483** 0.488** 0.420** 0.440** 0.522** 0.538** 
 (2.379) (2.381) (2.212) (2.247) (1.961) (2.054) (2.372) (2.442) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 381,397 
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.04 10.05 7.39 9.45 6.87 9.03 5.85 8.25 
         
Origins difficult to infer by name 
Revision×FavSurname 0.346 0.366 0.431 0.449* 0.421 0.450* 0.411 0.458* 
 (1.406) (1.529) (1.639) (1.782) (1.604) (1.734) (1.521) (1.691) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 381,383 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.72 9.70 7.17 9.25 6.59 8.70 5.68 8.05 
 
Panel C: Analyst reputation 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
All-star analysts 
Revision×FavSurname 0.510 0.412 0.498 0.364 0.526 0.427 0.793** 0.676** 
 (1.526) (1.411) (1.478) (1.205) (1.484) (1.346) (2.046) (1.973) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 204,336 204,336 204,336 204,336 204,336 204,336 204,336 204,336 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.53 9.49 6.96 9.05 6.38 8.53 5.42 7.85 
         
Non-all-star analysts 
Revision×FavSurname 0.401** 0.448*** 0.457** 0.507*** 0.403** 0.456** 0.412** 0.475*** 
 (2.323) (2.674) (2.421) (2.769) (2.194) (2.523) (2.213) (2.613) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 558,444 558,444 558,444 558,444 558,444 558,444 558,444 558,444 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.92 10.00 7.32 9.45 6.76 8.95 5.82 8.24 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Subsample analyses for market reaction regression estimates 
 
Panel D: The sign of revision news 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Positive forecast revisions 
Revision×FavSurname 0.463** 0.365* 0.485* 0.387 0.432 0.325 0.384 0.284 
 (1.984) (1.647) (1.897) (1.642) (1.558) (1.284) (1.213) (0.987) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 377,046 377,046 377,046 377,046 377,046 377,046 377,046 377,046 
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.44 9.49 8.03 9.24 7.83 9.15 7.41 8.98 
         
Negative forecast revisions 
Revision×FavSurname 0.271** 0.280** 0.327** 0.330** 0.292** 0.300** 0.423*** 0.426** 
 (2.221) (2.214) (2.318) (2.282) (2.047) (2.007) (2.666) (2.570) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 382,946 382,946 382,946 382,946 382,946 382,946 382,946 382,946 
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.56 10.18 7.56 9.27 6.91 8.70 6.00 8.06 
         
Panel E: Analyst gender 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Male analysts 
Revision×FavSurname 0.407** 0.427*** 0.465*** 0.484*** 0.436** 0.463*** 0.508*** 0.548*** 
 (2.449) (2.652) (2.597) (2.816) (2.454) (2.668) (2.785) (3.066) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 667,067 667,067 667,067 667,067 667,067 667,067 667,067 667,067 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.79 9.77 7.13 9.19 6.58 8.69 5.62 7.99 
         
Female analysts 
Revision×FavSurname 0.368 0.251 0.280 0.108 0.181 0.057 0.126 -0.007 
 (0.779) (0.530) (0.579) (0.210) (0.398) (0.119) (0.253) (-0.014) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 95,713 95,713 95,713 95,713 95,713 95,713 95,713 95,713 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.99 10.06 7.71 9.80 7.34 9.58 6.30 8.77 
 
Panel F: Analyst first name 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Americanized first names 
Revision×FavSurname 0.312 0.263 0.399* 0.341 0.431* 0.389* 0.586** 0.554** 
 (1.470) (1.219) (1.756) (1.488) (1.918) (1.669) (2.560) (2.329) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 528,551 528,551 528,551 528,551 528,551 528,551 528,551 528,551 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.98 9.99 7.38 9.45 6.82 8.96 5.87 8.23 
         
Non-Americanized first names 
Revision×FavSurname 0.523** 0.622*** 0.522** 0.624*** 0.399 0.511** 0.298 0.428* 
 (2.185) (2.760) (2.036) (2.610) (1.582) (2.177) (1.126) (1.742) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 4 
Number of observations 234,229 234,229 234,229 234,229 234,229 234,229 234,229 234,229 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.58 9.53 7.03 9.08 6.48 8.59 5.44 7.86 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Subsample analyses for market reaction regression estimates 
 
This table shows the estimates of pooled OLS market reaction regressions using subsamples based on investor 
sophistication (Panel A), the difficulty in inferring countries of origin from a surname (Panel B), analyst reputation 
(Panel C), the sign of revision news (Panel D), analyst gender (Panel E), and analysts’ first name (Panel F). The 
dependent variable is the size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window from trading day -1 to 
trading day n (n = 1, 3, 5, and 10), where trading day 0 is an analyst’s forecast revision date. FavSurname is Americans’ 
favorability of an analyst’s surname. Revision is the difference between an analyst’s current and preceding earnings 
forecast for a firm, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the current forecast date. In Panel A, we divide 
the sample into two subsamples by the sample median of institutional ownership. In Panel B, we divide the sample 
into two subsamples by the sample median of the fraction of U.S. immigrants whose nationality matches the most 
common country for a surname, conditional on the U.S. immigrants having the same surname. We assume that it is 
easier to infer the origin of an analyst from his or her name when a higher fraction of the U.S. immigrants with the 
analyst’s surname come from a single country. In Panel C, we divide the sample into two subsamples by whether an 
analyst has ever been ranked as an all-star analyst in Institutional Investor magazine. In Panel D, we divide the sample 
into two subsamples by the sign of a forecast revision. In Panel E, we divide the sample into two subsamples by 
analysts’ gender. In Panel F, we divide the sample into two subsamples by whether an analyst uses an Americanized 
first name. We define a first name as Americanized if it appears on the list of 100 most popular first names for male 
and female babies born in the United States between 1917 and 2016 (the list is available on the Social Security website 
at www.ssa.gov). Control variables and fixed effects are identical to those in Panel A of Table 4. In parentheses below 
coefficient estimates are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by analyst. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 7 
Variations within analyst-year, firm-year, or analyst-firm 
 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR [-1,+1] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Revision 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.687*** 0.707*** 1.156*** 1.166*** 
 (3.375) (3.378) (2.601) (2.673) (3.859) (3.876) 
Revision×FavSurname 0.446*** 0.446*** 0.280** 0.285** 0.493*** 0.488*** 
 (2.672) (2.675) (2.092) (2.125) (2.823) (2.776) 
FavSurname -0.024*** -0.024*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.010*** 
 (-3.901) (-3.915) (0.325) (-0.307) (0.302) (-2.687) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No No No No 
Brokerage fixed effects No No No Yes No No 
Year fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Analyst×Year fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No 
Firm×Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No 
Analyst×Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780 
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.23 8.26 22.72 22.72 10.36 10.52 
 
This table shows the estimates of pooled OLS market reaction regressions. We estimate the baseline OLS regressions 
in which the dependent variable is the size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window from trading 
day -1 to trading day +1, where trading day 0 is an analyst’s forecast revision date. FavSurname is Americans’ 
favorability of an analyst’s surname. Revision is the difference between an analyst’s current and preceding earnings 
forecast for a firm, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the current forecast date. The set of control 
variables is identical to that in Panel A of Table 4. In parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-statistics based on 
standard errors clustered by analyst. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable 




Two natural experiments 
 
Panel A: Matching covariates for the sample of the 9/11 terrorist attacks  
 Middle Eastern analysts Non-Middle Eastern analysts Test of differences  N = 13 N = 204 
Matching covariates Mean Mean t-statistic 
FavSurname 0.519 0.548 (-0.68) 
Mean accuracy -0.007 -0.009 (0.72) 
Brokerage size 4.032 3.866 (0.58) 
Forecast frequency 3.508 3.542 (-0.24) 
General experience 1.681 1.636 (0.33) 
Number of firms 9.461 11.683 (-1.48) 
 
Panel B: Matching covariates for the sample of the French and German opposition to the Iraq War 
 
 French and German analysts Non-French/Non-German analysts Test of differences  N = 248 N = 248 
Matching covariates Mean Mean t-statistic 
FavSurname 0.814 0.853 (-11.88)*** 
Mean accuracy -0.009 -0.008 (-0.59) 
Brokerage size 3.996 4.007 (-0.11) 
Forecast frequency 3.722 3.680 (0.79) 
General experience 1.979 1.975 (0.09) 
Number of firms 13.011 12.556 (0.90) 
 
Panel C: Americans' favorability toward analysts' surnames around the events of two natural experiments 
 Dependent variable: FavSurname 
Natural experiment: The 9/11 terrorist attacks  The French and German opposition to the Iraq War 
Treatment = 1, for Middle Eastern analysts  French and German analysts 
Post-shock = 1, after September 11, 2001  February 14, 2003 
Independent variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment 0.007 0.014  -0.045*** -0.045*** 
 (0.115) (0.224)  (-13.082) (-12.962) 
Treatment×Post-shock -0.218*** -0.224***  -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (-4.004) (-4.129)  (-14.809) (-14.886) 
Post-shock 0.077*** 0.093***  0.018*** 0.084*** 
 (5.926) (6.395)  (10.009) (42.224) 
Intercept 0.555*** 0.561***  0.819*** 0.782*** 
 (36.512) (34.275)  (249.112) (243.804) 
Year fixed effects No Yes  No Yes 
Number of observations 2,136 2,136  4,920 4,920 
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.79 12.55  26.37 44.26 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Two natural experiments 
 
Panel D: Difference-in-differences tests using two natural experiments 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR [-1,+1] 
Natural experiment: The 9/11 terrorist attacks  The French and German opposition to the Iraq War 
Treatment = 1, for Middle Eastern analysts  French and German analysts 
Post-shock = 1, after September 11, 2001  February 14, 2003 
Independent variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Revision 0.658*** -1.608  1.071*** 0.531 
 (3.059) (-0.849)  (11.629) (0.720) 
Revision×Treatment 1.112** 1.259**  0.169 0.075 
 (2.503) (2.011)  (1.378) (0.607) 
Revision×Treatment×Post-shock -1.643*** -1.863***  -0.687*** -0.500** 
 (-2.877) (-2.597)  (-3.055) (-2.410) 
Revision×Post-shock 0.974*** 1.250***  0.665*** 0.599*** 
 (3.618) (5.139)  (4.447) (3.950) 
Treatment×Post-shock -0.004 0.000  -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.032) (0.091)  (-1.088) (-1.039) 
Treatment 0.003 0.001  0.001 0.001 
 (0.997) (0.313)  (1.019) (1.196) 
Post-shock -0.003 0.011  0.006*** 0.015*** 
 (-0.701) (1.209)  (3.430) (7.806) 
Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 25,519 25,519  67,120 67,120 












Table 8 (Continued) 
Two natural experiments 
 
This table shows summary statistics for matching covariates and OLS regression results for difference-in-differences 
tests using the matched samples of our two natural experiments: (1) the 9/11 terrorist attacks and (2) the French and 
German opposition to the Iraq War. For the natural experiment of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (the French and German 
opposition to the Iraq War), treatment analysts are those who have a Middle Eastern (French or German) surname. A 
surname is defined as Middle Eastern when more than 30% of the U.S. immigrants having the surname come from 
Middle Eastern countries, such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey, and Yemen, or are identified as Arab or Muslim, according to the U.S. historical immigration records. A 
surname is defined as French and German when more than 40% of the U.S. immigrants with the surname come from 
either France or Germany. In Panel A, we report summary statistics for matching covariates for the sample of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. The sample is constructed by matching Middle Eastern analysts and control analysts on the following 
matching covariates using a coarsened exact matching (CEM) algorithm: FavSurname (Americans’ favorability of an 
analyst’s surname), mean accuracy (mean accuracy of an analyst’s last forecasts for firms in a year), brokerage size, 
forecast frequency, general experience, and number of firms. We conduct the matching at the end of year 2000. In 
Panel B, we report summary statistics for matching covariates for the sample of the French and German opposition to 
the Iraq War. We match French and German analysts with control analysts using the same set of matching covariates 
used in Panel A. We conduct a one-to-one matching at the end of year 2002. In Panels C and D, we restrict the sample 
period to the window from 1996 (1998) to 2006 (2008), excluding the transition year of 2001 (2003) for tests using 
the natural experiment of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (the French and German opposition to the Iraq War). In Panel C, 
we use observations at the analyst-year level and estimate OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is 
FavSurname. At the end of every December, we update FavSurname for all analysts in the matched samples using the 
most recent survey data from Gallup Analytics. In Panel D, we use observations at the forecast revision level and 
estimate the pooled OLS market reaction regressions in which the dependent variable is the size-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) over the window from trading day -1 to trading day +1, where trading day 0 is an analyst’s 
forecast revision date. Revision is the difference between an analyst’s current and preceding earnings forecast for a 
firm, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the current forecast date. In the sample of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks (the French and German opposition to the Iraq War), Treatment and Post-shock are indicator variables equal 
to 1 for Middle Eastern (French and German) analysts and for observations after September 11, 2001 (February 14, 
2003), respectively. The set of control variables is identical to that in Panel A of Table 4. In parentheses below 
coefficient estimates are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by analyst. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. ***, **, * indicate 







Panel A: Forecast accuracy and favorability of an analyst’s surname 
  Dependent variable: Accuracy 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
FavSurname 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.298) (-0.581) (0.941) 
Book-to-market   -0.007*** -0.006*** 
    (-28.975) (-17.443) 
Brokerage size   -0.000*** -0.000 
    (-3.288) (-1.470) 
Days since last forecast   0.000 -0.000*** 
    (1.305) (-4.404) 
Female analyst   -0.000 -0.000* 
    (-0.943) (-1.677) 
Forecast horizon   -0.002*** -0.003*** 
    (-28.128) (-34.931) 
Forecast frequency   -0.001*** 0.001*** 
    (-3.526) (7.337) 
Firm size   0.003*** 0.009*** 
    (43.166) (43.017) 
Firm-specific experience   -0.001*** -0.000*** 
    (-4.169) (-3.833) 
General experience   0.000** 0.000** 
    (2.155) (2.181) 
Institutional ownership   0.006*** 0.004*** 
    (14.883) (7.523) 
Lagged accuracy   0.432*** 0.143*** 
    (37.239) (12.579) 
Number of analysts   -0.000*** -0.000*** 
    (-23.722) (-21.606) 
Number of firms   0.000*** -0.000*** 
    (6.787) (-3.799) 
Number of industries   -0.000 0.000 
    (-0.011) (0.825) 
Intercept -0.004*** -0.030*** -0.111*** 
  (-9.520) (-25.196) (-40.360) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 213,549 213,549 213,549 
Adjusted R2 (%) 30.92 16.42 37.79 
 
Panel B: Forecast bias and favorability of an analyst’s surname 
  Dependent variable: Forecast bias 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
FavSurname 0.001 0.001** 0.000 
  (1.169) (2.043) (0.759) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 9 
Number of observations 213,549 213,549 213,549 
Adjusted R2 (%) 20.86 2.49 21.62 
 
Panel C: Forecast timeliness and favorability of an analyst’s surname 
  Dependent variable: Days since last forecast 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
FavSurname -0.044 -0.014 0.012 
  (-0.909) (-0.281) (0.266) 
Controls and fixed effects Identical to Panel A of Table 9 (Days since last forecast is omitted) 
Number of observations 213,549 213,549 213,549 
Adjusted R2 (%) 20.68 18.61 24.42 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
Forecast quality 
 
This table reports the estimates of pooled OLS forecast quality regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is 
Accuracy, measured as the negative value of the absolute difference between an analyst's last one-year-ahead earnings 
forecast and the actual earnings, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the forecast date. FavSurname is 
Americans’ favorability of an analyst’s surname. In Panel B, the dependent variable is Forecast bias (signed forecast 
error), measured as an analyst's last one-year-ahead earnings forecast minus the actual earnings, scaled by the stock 
price two trading days prior to the forecast date. In Panel C, the dependent variable is Days since last forecast, 
measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of days elapsed since the most recent earnings forecast for 
a firm was issued by another analyst. The set of controls and fixed effects are identical to those used in Panel A. In 
parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by analyst. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. ***, **, * 





  Dependent variable: 
  All-star Post-closure/merger termination Covering visible stocks 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
High FavSurname -0.075 -0.034 -0.172*** -0.084 -0.027 0.004 
  (-1.415) (-0.624) (-2.814) (-1.265) (-0.702) (0.090) 
Mean Accuracy 7.157*** 3.581* -5.226*** -5.707*** 7.297*** 5.908*** 
  (4.710) (1.757) (-2.634) (-2.776) (7.107) (5.773) 
Mean Accuracy×High FavSurname 6.767** 7.744** -7.590** -5.603* 0.364 0.956 
  (2.279) (2.393) (-2.445) (-1.736) (0.214) (0.560) 
Brokerage size   0.837***   -0.044   0.175*** 
    (21.563)   (-1.477)   (10.016) 
Female analyst   0.120*   0.125*   -0.010 
    (1.756)   (1.781)   (-0.187) 
General experience   0.418***   0.361***   0.123*** 
    (11.007)   (6.912)   (3.907) 
Number of firms   0.025***   -0.105***   0.054*** 
    (7.563)   (-14.346)   (14.386) 
Number of industries   -0.004   0.002   -0.087*** 
    (-0.330)   (0.123)   (-9.318) 
Intercept -0.951*** -5.518*** -1.583*** -0.715*** 1.264*** -0.008 
  (-20.881) (-28.318) (-9.499) (-2.867) (26.326) (-0.076) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 29,685 29,685 5,218 5,218 26,800 26,800 
Pseudo R2 (%) 2.09 25.43 2.71 15.25 3.28 11.24 
 
This table shows the estimates of career outcome regressions. We estimate pooled probit regressions for three 
dependent variables of analyst career outcomes: All-star equals 1 if an analyst is ranked as an all-star analyst by 
Institutional Investor magazine in the following year and 0 otherwise; Post-closure/merger termination equals 1 if an 
analyst disappears from the I/B/E/S within 3 years after his or her brokerage house goes out of business (i.e., closure) 
or goes through a merger (as either an acquirer or a target) and 0 otherwise; and Covering visible stocks equals 1 if an 
analyst covers at least one stock that ranks in the top decile by total analyst coverage across all stocks in the following 
year and 0 otherwise. High FavSurname is an indicator variable equal to 1 for an analyst whose surname favorability 
(FavSurname) ranks in the top tercile among all analysts in a year and 0 otherwise. Mean Accuracy is the mean 
accuracy of an analyst’s last forecasts issued for all firms he or she covers in a year. In parentheses below coefficient 
estimates are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by analyst. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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In this online appendix, we report results for several additional tests. Specifically, we identify 
underlying factors that form the favorability of a surname. We also examine the impact of surname 
favorability on post-revision price drifts. Lastly, we provide the robustness of our findings to using 
an alternative data source and measure of full name favorability.  
1. Decomposing Surname Favorability 
 Several factors can influence surname favorability. For example, Americans’ in-group bias 
against foreigners may be an underlying factor for surname favorability (e.g., Kumar et al., 2015). 
Also, cultural or ethnic similarities between the United States and the country associated with a 
surname or the perceived level of the country’s corruption are likely to affect surname favorability.  
Following prior studies (Hwang, 2011; Kumar et al., 2015), we construct five variables to 
capture the underlying factors of surname favorability: Foreignness captures whether the name of 
an analyst sounds foreign from American perspective. Same ancestry captures the similarity in 
ancestry between U.S. citizens and people in the countries associated with an analyst’s surname. 
Same language captures the proportion of countries associated with an analyst’s surname that 
speak English as the official language. Cultural distance captures the mean absolute difference in 
six dimensions of the Hofstede cultural index between the United States and the countries 
associated with an analyst’s surname. Lastly, Country corruption captures the mean level of 
perceived corruption in countries associated with an analyst’s surname.  
 We first examine the relation between surname favorability and the five aforementioned 
variables. Panel A of Table O.1 reports results from pooled OLS regressions in which the 
dependent variable is Americans’ favorability of an analyst’s surname (FavSurname), and the 
independent variables are each or all of the five underlying factors. Consistent with our conjecture, 
we find that surname favorability is positively associated with the ethnic and linguistic similarities 
3 
between the United States and an analyst’s country of origin reflected in his or her surname, 
whereas it is negatively associated with the foreignness of an analyst’s name, cultural distance, 
and the level of perceived corruption in the countries associated with the surname. 
 Next, we investigate which underlying factor of surname favorability plays the most 
important role in driving our findings. Using the coefficient estimates and the residual obtained 
from the pooled OLS regression of FavSurname on Foreignness, Same ancestry, Same language, 
Cultural distance, and Country corruption, we measure the six components of surname 
favorability explained by each of these five factors and the residual. For example, we measure the 
component of surname favorability explained by the foreignness of an analyst’s name, 
FavSurname (Foreignness), as the coefficient estimate of Foreignness times the value of 
Foreignness. The residual component, FavSurname (Residual), is measured as the residual 
obtained from the regression.  
Panel B of Table O.1 reports results for the baseline regressions using the six components 
of favorability. In column (1), we find that the component of surname favorability associated with 
the foreignness of an analyst’s name has a significant and positive effect on market reactions to 
forecast revisions. This result suggests that Americans’ in-group bias triggered by foreign-
sounding names is an important driver for the estimated effects of surname favorability. We do not 
find significant effects of favorability components associated with other four factors.  
Interestingly, we find significant results using the residual component of surname 
favorability, FavSurname (Residual), even after controlling for all other favorability components.1 
The evidence implies that the component of favorability not explained by foreignness, cultural 
proximity, and country corruption still has important explanatory power for investor reactions to 
                                           
1 In untabulated tests, we include these five factors as control variables in our baseline regression model. We still find 
significant results for the surname favorability effect.  
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forecast revisions. This finding clearly distinguishes our work from prior studies examining the 
effect of in-group bias and cultural proximity in the capital market. 
2. Post-revision Price Drift 
 We now examine whether surname favorability mitigates investors’ underreaction to 
forecast revisions. Gleason and Lee (2003) show that analysts’ forecast revisions predict future 
abnormal returns over the next six months or one year, which is referred to as the post-revision 
price drift. If the market underreacts to forecast revisions, we should find that surname favorability 
is associated with weaker underreaction, because it has a positive effect on the immediate reaction 
to forecast revisions.  
 Following Gleason and Lee (2003), we measure the abnormal drift return to a forecast 
revision as the size-adjusted buy-and-hold return (BHAR) over the window from trading day +m 
(m = 2 or 11) to trading day +n (n = 127 or 253), where trading day 0 is the forecast revision date.2 
In Table O.2, we estimate the post-revision price drift regression in which the dependent variable 
is an abnormal drift return and the main independent variable of interest is the interaction term 
between Revision and High FavSurname. High FavSurname equals 1 if an analyst has a surname 
that ranks in the top tercile of surname favorability among all analysts in a calendar quarter and 0 
otherwise.  
 In columns (1) to (4), we report results using our full sample. We do not find significant 
post-revision price drifts using the full sample, making it difficult for us to make a clear conclusion 
about the effect of surname favorability on investor underreaction.3 Thus, as the next step, we 
                                           
2 We use BHAR as CAR implicitly assumes daily rebalancing and may lead to an upward bias in the return over long 
periods (Roll, 1983). In untabulated tests, we find that our results are robust to using CAR for the post-revision price 
drift tests. 
3 One potential explanation for not finding a significant drift using the full sample could be because our sample period 
spans more recent years from 1996 to 2014. Gleason and Lee (2003) use data in the 1990s. Another possible 
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confine our tests to a subsample of firms and analyst forecasts that are likely to have a significant 
underreaction to forecast revisions. According to Gleason and Lee (2003) and Zhang (2006), the 
post-revision price drift is likely to be greater as a firm’s information environment is less 
transparent, when forecasts are issued by analysts who are less visible (i.e., non-all-star), and when 
forecasts provide more information to investors (i.e., non-herding forecasts). Thus, we construct a 
subsample by excluding firms in the top tercile of total analyst coverage or institutional ownership 
and dropping herding forecasts and forecast revisions issued by all-star analysts.4 We re-estimate 
the drift regression using the subsample and report results in columns (5) to (8) of Table O.2.  
Coefficients on Revision are positive and statistically significant across all four columns, 
suggesting significant drifts in this subsample. More importantly, we also find negative and 
significant coefficients on Revision×High FavSurname, suggesting that surname favorability is 
associated with a weaker underreaction to forecast revisions.  
The results in Table O.2 show that surname favorability also affects price efficiency within 
a subsample with significant post-revision price drifts. However, the fact that we do not find 
significant post-revision price drifts nor the effect of surname favorability on drifts in the overall 
sample raises a question about the extent to which the surname favorability affects market 
mispricing. 
3. Robustness to Alternative Measures  
 We further test the robustness of our findings to using an alternative measure and a 
different data source. First, we use a name-based ethnicity classification provided by OnoMap, 
                                           
explanation is that we include more control variables and fixed effects. 
4 We find a significant surname favorability effect for the market’s immediate reaction to forecast revisions in this 
subsample (regression models in Panel A of Table 4). In untabulated tests, we find that excluding firms in the top 
quartile or quintile of analyst coverage or institutional ownership does not change our results. In addition, we find that 
results are robust to removing the conditions on total analyst coverage or herding forecasts.  
6 
which derives data from telephone directories and electoral registers in 26 countries (Mateos et al., 
2011). Using the ethnicity classifications in OnoMap, we construct an alternative measure of 
surname favorability, FavSName (OnoMap), and find that our main findings remain qualitatively 
the same. The results are provided in Panel A of Table O.3. Second, using a hand-collected dataset 
of analysts’ full names and the ethnicity classifications in OnoMap, we construct a measure of full 
name favorability, FavFName (OnoMap). We find that our results are robust to measuring the 
favorability of an analyst’s full name using a different data source. The results are provided in 
Panel B of Table O.3. 
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Table O.1 
Decomposition of surname favorability 
 
Panel A: Potential underlying factors of surname favorability 
 Dependent variable: FavSurname 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreignness -0.174***     -0.021*** 
 (-26.026)     (-5.362) 
Same ancestry  0.989***    -0.037 
  (52.485)    (-1.252) 
Same language   0.167***   -0.093*** 
   (57.277)   (-13.943) 
Cultural distance    -0.010***  -0.014*** 
    (-86.795)  (-28.657) 
Country corruption     -0.054*** -0.003* 
     (-47.952) (-1.677) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 31,443 31,443 31,443 31,443 31,443 31,443 
Adjusted R2 (%) 25.12 43.42 46.92 72.47 54.57 76.05 
 
Panel B: Effects of individual components of surname favorability on market reactions to forecast revisions 
 Dependent variable: Size-adjusted CAR [-1, +1] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Revision 1.144*** 1.086*** 1.109*** 1.130*** 0.941*** 1.139*** 1.488*** 
 (4.896) (4.572) (4.676) (4.839) (3.675) (4.847) (4.093) 
Revision×FavSurname (Foreignness) 4.011*      4.525* 
 (1.956)      (1.793) 
Revision×FavSurname (Same ancestry)  -0.576     -1.668 
  (-0.341)     (-0.619) 
Revision×FavSurname (Same language)   0.102    1.383* 
   (0.310)    (1.724) 
Revision×FavSurname (Cultural distance)    0.124   0.622 
    (0.913)   (1.628) 
Revision×FavSurname (Country corruption)     -3.611  0.669 
     (-1.640)  (0.170) 
Revision×FavSurname (Residual)      1.027*** 0.973*** 
      (4.007) (3.900) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 753,714 759,544 762,780 762,244 762,568 750,044 750,044 




Table O.1 (Continued) 
Decomposition of surname favorability 
 
This table shows results from pooled OLS regressions. In Panel A, we estimate OLS regressions in which the 
dependent variable is Americans’ favorability of an analyst’s surname (FavSurname), and the independent variables 
are five potential underlying factors of surname favorability and year fixed effects. Foreignness is the percentage of 
the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers who indicate that the name of the analyst is foreign sounding (Kumar 
et al., 2015). Same ancestry is the weighted average of the percentage of U.S. citizens whose ancestors came from 
countries associated with the analyst’s surname. We obtain the ancestry of the U.S. citizens from the U.S. Census 
Bureau. Same language is the weighted average of English dummy for countries associated with the analyst’s surname. 
The English dummy variable is equal to 1 if English is the official or the most popular language for a country according 
to the World Factbook by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 0 otherwise. Cultural distance is the weighted 
average of the culture difference for countries associated with the analyst’s surname. The culture difference is 
measured as the mean value of the absolute differences in the Hofstede index between the United States and the 
country in question, across all six cultural dimensions. Country corruption is the weighted average of negative one 
times the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International for countries associated with 
the analyst’s surname. Weights are computed based on the frequency of the nationality of U.S. immigrants who have 
the same surname as an analyst. In Panel B, we estimate the pooled OLS market reaction regressions in which the 
dependent variable is the size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window from trading day -1 to 
trading day +1, where trading day 0 is an analyst’s forecast revision date. Revision is the difference between an 
analyst’s current and preceding earnings forecast for a firm, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the 
current forecast date. FavSurname (Component) is measured as the value of Component times the coefficient estimate 
of Component, obtained from the pooled OLS regression of FavSurname on Foreignness, Same ancestry, Same 
language, Cultural distance and Country corruption. FavSurname (Residual) is the residual value obtained from the 
OLS regression. In Panel B, for brevity we suppress coefficient estimates of the stand-alone variables, FavSurname 
(Component) and FavSurname (Residual). The set of control variables is identical to that in Panel A of Table 4. In 
parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by analyst. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table O.2 
Post-revision price drift 
 
  Dependent variable: Size-adjusted BHAR 
Return window: [+2,+127] [+11,+127] [+2,+253] [+11,+253]  [+2,+127] [+11,+127] [+2,+253] [+11,+253] 
Sample composition: Full sample  Subsample with significant drifts 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revision -0.570 -0.590 0.749 0.450  2.201** 2.661*** 5.607*** 6.121*** 
 (-0.952) (-1.040) (0.844) (0.517)  (2.382) (3.028) (4.304) (4.799) 
Revision×High FavSurname -0.044 -0.057 -0.087 -0.119  -0.209* -0.201** -0.324** -0.330** 
 (-0.549) (-0.751) (-0.713) (-0.997)  (-1.951) (-1.990) (-2.029) (-2.137) 
High FavSurname -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.051) (0.039) (-0.847) (-0.809)  (0.094) (0.036) (-0.062) (-0.137) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 762,780 762,780 762,780 762,780  195,530 195,530 195,530 195,530 
Adjusted R2 (%) 15.12 14.16 23.86 23.16  21.88 20.52 32.61 31.67 
 
This table shows results from pooled OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over the next six-month 
or one-year window, starting from trading day m (m = 2 or 11) and ending on trading day n (n = 127 or 253), where trading day 0 is an analyst’s forecast revision 
date. Revision is the difference between an analyst’s current and preceding earnings forecast for a firm, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the 
current forecast date. High FavSurname is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst ranks in the top tercile by surname favorability (FavSurname) among all 
analysts in a calendar quarter and 0 otherwise. In columns (5), (6), (7) and (8), we estimate the OLS regressions for post-revision price drifts after excluding firms 
in the top tercile of total analyst coverage or institutional ownership and dropping herding forecasts or forecasts issued by all-star analysts. We define a forecast as 
herding if it is between the analyst’s own prior forecast and the consensus (Gleason and Lee, 2003). The set of control variables is identical to that in Panel A of 
Table 4. In parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by analyst. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 







Panel A: OnoMap-based measure of surname favorability 
 Dependent Variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revision 0.889*** 0.892** 0.978*** 0.984*** 1.052*** 1.039*** 1.007*** 0.879** 
 (5.334) (2.428) (5.863) (2.615) (6.420) (2.636) (6.112) (2.099) 
Revision×FavSName (OnoMap) 0.416** 0.607*** 0.390* 0.588*** 0.325 0.542*** 0.354* 0.587*** 
 (2.058) (3.019) (1.922) (2.925) (1.630) (2.712) (1.763) (2.837) 
FavSName (OnoMap) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.902) (0.914) (0.622) (0.597) (0.168) (0.144) (-0.486) (-0.363) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 436,821 436,821 436,821 436,821 436,821 436,821 436,821 436,821 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.90 9.93 7.36 9.46 6.84 9.01 5.90 8.33 
 
Panel B: OnoMap-based measure of full name favorability 
 Dependent Variable: Size-adjusted CAR 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revision 0.456** 0.073 0.493*** 0.110 0.598*** 0.213 0.540*** -0.167 
 (2.457) (0.220) (2.631) (0.321) (3.207) (0.600) (2.580) (-0.427) 
Revision×FavFName (OnoMap) 0.909*** 1.143*** 0.943*** 1.199*** 0.840*** 1.127*** 0.874*** 1.208*** 
 (4.126) (5.425) (4.223) (5.550) (3.781) (5.189) (3.525) (4.953) 
FavFName (OnoMap) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.849) (0.740) (0.550) (0.438) (0.327) (0.149) (-0.574) (-0.592) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 604,536 604,536 604,536 604,536 604,536 604,536 604,536 604,536 
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.87 9.91 7.28 9.41 6.73 8.93 5.79 8.22 
 
This table shows results for the market reaction regression estimates, using alternative measures of name favorability. 
We estimate the baseline OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the size-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) over the window from trading day -1 to trading day n (n = 1, 3, 5, and 10), where trading day 0 is an 
analyst’s forecast revision date. Revision is the difference between an analyst’s current and preceding earnings forecast 
for a firm, scaled by the stock price two trading days prior to the current forecast date. In Panel A, we construct an 
alternative measure of surname favorability, FavSName (OnoMap), using the surname-ethnicity classifications in 
OnoMap. In Panel B, we construct an alternative measure of full name favorability, FavFName (OnoMap), using the 
full name-ethnicity classifications in OnoMap. Control variables and fixed effects are identical to those in Panel A of 
Table 4. In parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by analyst. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
